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ABSTRACT 
The most recent manifestation of a new “Great Game,” or a resurgence of interest 
in the geopolitical competition taking place in the Caucasus, occurred in August 2008 
when Russia invaded and occupied parts of the Republic of Georgia.  Russia’s invasion, 
the first use of force outside its territory since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
has forced a reassessment of U.S. and NATO strategy toward Russia and its relationship 
with the Republic of Georgia.  The United States and NATO have yet to develop a new 
strategy that balances their enlargement policy of supporting Georgian sovereignty and 
independence with concerns about growing Russian security interests in the region.  
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine Georgia’s national security 
dilemmas and explain the principal components of U.S. engagement policies designed to 
manage its strategic predicament.  This thesis examines whether these engagement 
policies contribute to U.S. and NATO interests, bring greater stability to the region, and 
enhance European security.  The study also analyzes how U.S. engagement in Georgia 
affects Georgian and Russian interests and explores the implications for U.S.-Russian 
relations in terms of a new “Great Game” of geopolitical competition in the region.    
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A. THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND THE NEW “GREAT GAME” IN 
THE CAUCASUS 
In the foreword to The Great Game: the Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, 
Peter Hopkirk (1992), writing a year after the collapse of the Soviet Union, observed that:  
Suddenly, after many years of almost total obscurity, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus find themselves once more back in the headlines, a position 
frequently occupied during the nineteenth century.  Already political 
analysts and headline writers are calling this maneuvering for long-term 
advantage, the new “Great Game.” (p. xv) 
The most recent manifestation of this resurgence of the “Great Game” and 
geopolitical competition taking place in the Caucasus occurred in August 2008 when 
Russia invaded and occupied parts of the Republic of Georgia.  The Russian invasion, the 
first use of force outside its territory since the demise of the Soviet Union, has forced a 
reassessment of U.S. strategy toward Russia, including its relationship with the Republic 
of Georgia.  It may have also accelerated a realignment already taking place in Europe, 
where members of NATO and the European Union have warned of the threat posed by a 
resurgent Russia. 
This new “Great Game” is being shaped by geopolitical competition over ideas, 
resources, and access to an energy rich region located on the mountainous periphery of 
the former Soviet Union, between the Caspian and Black Seas (see Figure 1).  This 
region has long been characterized by intense ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity, as 
well as chronic instability and conflict.  According to historian Craig Nation (2007), the 
Caucasus is an area that is “…plagued by many of the “typical” post-Soviet dilemmas, 
including: incomplete nation-building, deeply rooted corruption, regional conflict and 
separatism, fragile democratization, and thriving criminal networks” (p. 3).  Despite these 
challenges, the region’s strategic significance and great power interest in the Caucasus 
has grown over the past two decades.  
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In particular, the Republic of Georgia’s search for independence and sovereignty 
as a modern nation-state has been hampered by significant internal and external 
challenges.  Georgia is challenged internally by ethno-separatist conflicts, weak 
democratic institutions, poorly developed economic infrastructure, and widespread 
corruption.  The most important external challenge to Georgia’s standing as an 
independent nation is a resurgent Russia that seeks to maintain its security through 
control over its “near abroad” in the Caucasus region.  These internal and external 
tensions are exacerbated by great power rivalry between the United States and Russia 
over the issue of Georgia’s application for NATO membership and an assertive U.S. 
engagement policy that includes generous military and security assistance.   
The 2008 Russian invasion of the Republic of Georgia has rekindled widespread 
interest in the South Caucasus and a search for a new U.S. engagement strategy.  This 
new strategy seeks to balance the current U.S. policy in support of Georgian sovereignty 
and independence with resurgent Russian security interests in the region.  This new 
strategy also plays a critical role in U.S., NATO, Russian, and Georgian relations for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Figure 1.   The Caucasus and Central Asia (From: Central Asia Maps, 2009) 
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B. COMPETING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: REALISM 
VS. IDEALISM   
At least since Machiavelli published the Prince (1513), there have been two 
opposing schools of thought regarding the international relations theory and the nature of 
politics.  These two schools of political thought differ fundamentally on the conception of 
man, society, and politics.  The Machiavellian paradigm or “realist” school has been 
routinely contrasted with the “idealist” school of thought in politics and international 
affairs.  Realists focus on state power as the ultimate authority in world politics.  National 
interest is determined through a clash of conflicting interests, divide and rule, and the 
balance of power.  In contrast, the “idealist” or Grotian school emphasizes the importance 
of authority, interdependence, and the even distribution of power.  The idealist school 
focuses on the primacy of duty, natural laws and rights, and the conscience of mankind to 
determine what governments “ought” to prescribe as the ultimate authority in politics 
(Wight, 1991, pp. 1–3).  There are two additional paradigms of international theory that 
include some idealist concepts.  The Kantian paradigm stresses social progress, the spirit 
of the enlightenment, and the primacy of domestic policy.  The Quaker (pacifist) 
paradigm stresses the brotherhood of man and repudiates international politics altogether 
(pp. 1–3).     
Political Scientist Arnold Wolfers (1969) maintains that this “realist-idealist” 
debate remained largely academic and “power politics” and “realism” dominated state-to-
state relations until the first leader of a major power, Woodrow Wilson, sought to 
transform the international system (p. 175).  Wilson sought to create a new era that still 
influences Western politics today and included such idealist precepts as: democratization, 
collective security, international law, and the creation of a League of Nations.  Wolfers 
maintains that American statesmen and the American public find themselves continually 
torn between the conflicting pull of idealist and realist thought.  According to historian 
David Kennedy (2009), American foreign relations since 1914 has been heavily 




represented by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Henry Kissinger (p. 19).  Kennedy maintains 
that in the aftermath of 9/11 the “realism-idealism” debate has, if anything, taken on even 
greater vitality.   
In their study on Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye (1989) maintain 
that world political realities are usually a combination of realist assumptions and idealism 
and the two approaches can be complementary (pp. 23–24).  The authors assert that there 
are three integral assumptions to the realist vision: first, that states are predominant and 
they act as coherent units; second, that force is the most useful and effective means of 
wielding power; and third, that there is a hierarchy of issues in world politics headed by 
military security.  Idealists challenge these assumptions and maintain that there are 
situations in world politics in which actors other than states participate, a clear hierarchy 
of issues does not exist, and force is often an ineffective instrument of policy.  The 
authors define this second set of characteristics where there are multiple channels 
connecting societies, multiple sets of issues with no clear hierarchy, and military force is 
not used to resolve issues as complex interdependence (pp. 23–24).  However, most 
authors concede that the realist and idealist viewpoints are ideal types, and that in the real 
world, most situations fall somewhere between these two extremes.     
The debate about idealism versus realism may in fact reflect a fundamental 
contradiction that is at the very core of American foreign policy going back to the lofty 
principles of the founding fathers on the one hand and the messy practice of real-world 
politics on the other.  This realist-idealist tension has been one of the key challenges for 
U.S. foreign policy in that its idealism, that goes back to the founding of the republic, is 
often symbolic, while the actual day-to-day practice must often be a realist calculus.  This 
fundamental contradiction inherent in American foreign policy may help explain the 
current U.S. engagement strategy in the Republic of Georgia in practice.  The present 
policy promotes an idealist agenda in the form of greater democratization, nation 
building, free markets, and close security ties with the U.S. while at the same time 
maintaining a realist calculus by maintaining ambiguity about a security guarantee to 
Georgia through NATO membership or bilateral agreements.   
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C. REALISM AND IDEALISM: U.S. ENGAGEMENT AND THE REPUBLIC 
OF GEORGIA  
Barack Obama and Joe Biden will address the challenge posed by an 
increasingly autocratic and bellicose Russia by pursuing a new, 
comprehensive strategy that advances American national interests without 
compromising our enduring principles. 
“Meeting the Challenge of Resurgent Russia.” (2008, 
Foreign Policy Statement, www.barackobama.com) 
 
The challenge for the United States is encapsulated in the above Foreign Policy 
Statement and highlights the current U.S. policy dilemma regarding the Republic of 
Georgia where principles may conflict with security interests.  In the context of the 
current U.S. engagement strategy toward the Republic of Georgia, this dilemma is 
manifested in two contrasting schools of thought.  The idealist school maintains that the 
current level of U.S. security assistance serves crucial U.S. interests in the South 
Caucasus and advocates containment of Russian influence in the region.  The realist 
school maintains that although U.S. interests in Georgia and the Caucasus are important, 
they are not vital and that the current level of U.S. engagement in Georgia may contribute 
to instability in the region. 
The proponents of containment maintain that a high level of U.S. engagement in 
Georgia and membership in NATO would strengthen its independence and sovereignty.  
This school of thought holds that U.S. aid is required to bolster Georgia’s security and 
independence, and to prevent the spread of terrorism in the area.  The most important 
aspects of this activist engagement policy are support for Georgian NATO membership, 
robust military-security support arrangements, and democratic and market economic 
reform.  Ariel Cohen (2009), a Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies 
at the Heritage Foundation, advocates a “vigilant” U.S. policy to defend Georgia’s 
territorial integrity and to extend NATO Membership Action Plans (MAPs) to both 
Georgia and Ukraine (p. 11).  Concerning Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, Cohen 
maintains that:  
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History has shown that the most dangerous times are the ones when new 
powers (or resurgent ones) attempt to overturn the status quo.  The United 
States and its allies must remain vigilant and willing to defend freedom 
and prevent Russia from engendering shifts in the global power structure 
detrimental to U.S. national security interests. (p. 13) 
Advocates of this strategy maintain that Georgia’s membership in NATO would 
have deterred the Russian invasion in August 2008.  Such an active engagement policy 
would also reduce Russia’s influence and the probability of its interference in Georgia’s 
internal affairs.  Some advocates of this school also suggest that NATO’s weak response 
(to the 2008 Russian incursion into Georgia) and continued failure to offer Georgia 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) status formally, encourages Russian assertiveness and 
constitutes a policy of appeasement.  In their view, this failure acquiesces in Russia’s 
illegitimate claim to a de facto sphere of influence in Georgia.  Svante Cornell (2007) at 
the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute asserts that, “Appeasement policies, which is what 
the United States has been attempting, have failed, for the simple reasons that appeasing a 
counterpart [Russia] motivated by zero-sum thinking is not possible” (p. 35).  In 
Cornell’s view, rather than restraining Russian conduct, such appeasement policies have 
emboldened an increasingly assertive and aggressive Russian policy (p. 35).   
In addition, idealists assert that NATO enlargement to include Georgia is 
considered a positive-sum benefit for the international community that brings greater 
stability to the Caucasus region.  NATO is viewed as not only a defensive alliance, but 
also as an effective mechanism for resolving disputes between nations and ameliorating 
conflict.  Accordingly, many of the disputes in Central and Eastern Europe have tended to 
be attenuated as part of the NATO membership process.  In Congressional testimony to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried stated 
that “NATO enlargement has proven to be a strikingly effective mechanism for resolving 
disputes between nations” (U.S. Senate Hearing, 2008, p. 31).  In this view, Russian 
attempts to undermine this process by opposing NATO enlargement in Georgia are 
viewed as outmoded, zero-sum thinking in Moscow.  
Finally, the adherents of the idealist school maintain that an assertive U.S. 
engagement policy would also ensure continued Western access to the vital resources of 
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the Caspian Sea oil basin, secure regional allies and potential military access (over-flight 
and potential basing), and extend U.S. strategic reach into Central Asia.  The European 
Union (EU) has also expressed interest in the transit of energy resources through the 
southern Caucasus as an alternative to exclusive Russian control over energy supplies 
from this region. In reference to U.S. energy and security interests in the Caspian energy 
region, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza declared that “we’re not 
embarrassed to say that energy is a strategic interest.  We [also] have …traditional 
security interests-meaning restoring the territorial integrity of the states in the 
region…and then we have a third set of interests, in democratic and market economic 
reform…based on our belief that stability only comes from legitimacy” (CRS Political, 
2009, p. 1).  
The realist school is concerned with the traditional balance of power and 
questions whether the southern Caucasus region is a vital U.S. interest necessitating 
enhanced U.S. security commitments and aid.  This balance of power school maintains 
that the current U.S. engagement strategy, which promotes the Republic of Georgia’s 
membership in NATO, also encourages an assertive Georgian foreign policy, threatens 
Russia in its own back yard, and contributes to instability in the region.  Dmitri Trenin 
(2008) at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace asserts that “the next U.S. 
administration will need to recognize that NATO’s expansion has reached safe limits, and 
that any more [movement] in the direction of Ukraine and Georgia is fraught with real 
danger” (p. 6).  In this view, NATO’s enlargement encompassing the former Eastern 
Bloc, the Baltic region, and parts of the Balkans (with a total of 28 members) may have 
reached the limits of growth when balanced by a newly assertive Russia.  
Realists assert that the weak U.S. response following the Russian invasion of 
Georgia in August 2008 confirms the faults of containment as an engagement strategy.  
This policy left Washington little practical leverage when faced with a Russian 
application of raw military power in Georgia.  In an article in the New York Times, 
journalist Tom Shanker reported that, “the Bush administration, after considerable 
internal debate, has decided not to take direct punitive action against Russia for its  
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conflict with Georgia, concluding that it has little leverage if it acts unilaterally and that it 
would be better off pressing for a chorus of international criticism to be led by Europe” 
(Shanker, 2008, p. A1).   
Members of the realist school of thought point out that had NATO formally 
invited Georgia to join the alliance via the MAP process at the NATO Summit in 
Bucharest in April 2008 as advocated by some U.S. policy makers, the alliance may have 
come into direct military confrontation with Russia.  In a December 2008 Hearing of the 
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Jim Webb discussed the circumstances 
under which the United States might feel compelled to respond militarily to situations 
like the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict:  
If Georgia had been a NATO member when this incident occurred, despite 
the tempestuous nature of the leadership in Georgia that was something of 
lighting a fuse on it…we would have had a different set of responsibilities 
to be looking at as a country.  These are the kind of situations, I think that 
give a lot of people pause when we talk about expanding NATO in the 
way we’ve been expanding it. (U.S. Senate Hearing, 2008, pp. 42–43)   
Furthermore, realists argue that the current U.S. policy of supporting Georgia’s 
entry into NATO via the MAP process has created tensions within the alliance and over 
the security guarantee expressed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  This article 
calls for the mutual defense of all members in the event of an attack on any individual 
member.  In his remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John Warner 
raised the issue of NATO enlargement and the requirements of Article 5: 
Therefore as we proceed to try and advance the cause of democracy in 
various parts of the world, we have to be very conscious that a lot of these 
things are deep-rooted, deep-seated, and can start a flash fire which can 
burst on the scene into major conflict.  That leads me to the question of the 
commitments, so to speak, to bring about admission of Georgia and 
Ukraine into NATO.  What concerns me is that this action in Georgia, this 
confrontation, brings to the forefront this issue of admission of new 
nations, the potential set of conflicts that they bring to the table, and 
consequently all members of NATO must recognize that they could be 
involved in an actual shooting war. (U.S. Senate Hearing, 2008, p. 29) 
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Lastly, realists point out that a NATO security guarantee to Georgia would not 
only commit the Alliance to the defense of Georgia against external threats from non-
NATO adversaries, but would also tie its mutual security to the unresolved internal 
conflicts in Georgia’s separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Trenin (2008) 
argues that “a Georgia in NATO still claiming ownership over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia would turn those disputes into direct issues between NATO and Russia” (p. 6).  
According to this view, U.S. policy regarding Georgia’s candidacy for NATO 
membership may have been a contributing factor in the Russian decision to invade the 
Republic of Georgia. 
D. THE FOCUS OF THESIS RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Georgia’s national security dilemmas and 
explain the principal components of U.S. engagement policies designed to manage 
Tbilisi’s strategic predicament.  This thesis examines whether these engagement policies 
support U.S. and NATO interests, bring greater stability to the region, and enhance 
European security.  The study also analyzes how U.S. engagement in Georgia affects 
Georgian and Russian interests and explores the implications for U.S.-Russian relations 
in terms of a new “Great Game” competition for control over the region.  Finally, the 
study addresses whether U.S. and NATO engagement policies increases the likelihood of 
continued Russian intervention in the Republic of Georgia.   
Since the U.S. engagement policy is closely tied to what might be called a 
“Georgian Gordian knot,” both the internal ethno-nationalist challenges, as well as 
external security relationships with Russia and NATO are explored in this thesis.  In this 
case, the Gordian knot is used as a metaphor for a complicated problem for which it is 
very difficult to find a solution.  The expression “cut the Gordian Knot” refers to 
Georgian efforts to solve its complicated problems forcefully or by some unexpected 
means (Gordian Knot, Wikipedia, 2009).   
Chapter II attempts to unravel the Georgian Gordian knot first by exploring the 
historical context of Georgia’s ethno-nationalist separatist movements and then by tracing 
the evolution of Georgia’s post-Soviet national security policy of increasing integration 
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with the United States, NATO, and the European Union. The chapter uses political 
scientist Ted Gurr’s (1993) theory of ethno-political action to explain Georgia’s separatist 
movements and understand implications for European security.  
Chapter III describes U.S. engagement policy toward the Republic of Georgia and 
discusses “Great Game” consequences that may contribute to instability in the Caucasus 
and within the NATO Alliance.  This chapter also explores whether NATO membership 
and the promise of a security guarantee under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty may 
contribute to Georgian and European security.  The chapter describes five major 
components of the current U.S. engagement policy with Georgia, which include: (1) U.S. 
support for Georgia’s NATO membership and the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic 
Partnership; (2) the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP); (3) U.S. foreign aid and 
democratization efforts in Georgia; (4) U.S. policies regarding Georgia’s separatist areas 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and (5) U.S. economic and energy policies in Georgia. 
Chapter IV analyzes Russian interests in the South Caucasus and attempts to 
explore its complex role in the tangled Georgian Gordian knot.  The analysis includes a 
literature review of both internal and external sources of Russian conduct in Georgia 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union and particularly during former President Putin’s 
tenure.  The study discusses the sources of Russian disillusionment with NATO 
enlargement and other policies that have brought U.S.-Russian relations to a post-Cold 
War low point.  The chapter also briefly discusses the causes of the outbreak of war in 
August 2008 and the conclusion reached by the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia released in October 2009 by the European Union 
(IFFMCG, 2009).   
The final concluding section of the thesis, attempts to adjudicate between the two 
realist and idealist schools of thought regarding the appropriate level of U.S. engagement 
in Georgia and describes how each approach can contribute to U.S. interests and enhance 
European, Georgian, and NATO security.  Policy recommendations for a U.S. 
engagement strategy that protects U.S., NATO, and Georgian interests, while at the same 
time addressing resurgent Russian concerns are also made. 
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II. UNRAVELING THE GORDIAN KNOT: THE GEORGIAN 
SECURITY DILEMMA 
The Georgian Gordian knot revolves around the country’s determination to break 
its traditional close ties with Russia and seek security and independence through Western 
institutions, such as NATO and the European Union.  In this case, the Gordian knot refers 
to a legend associated with Alexander the Great often used as a metaphor for an 
intractable problem that can only be solved by a bold stroke (Gordian Knot, Wikipedia, 
2009).  However, Georgia’s unresolved separatist conflicts threaten to undermine its 
goals of greater political stability and integration with the West, while risking 
confrontation with Russia.   
At the same time, Moscow seeks to undermine the prospects for Georgian 
membership in NATO by aggravating unresolved territorial conflicts and highlighting the 
issues of confrontation with Russia.  In August 2008, Russia invaded and occupied the 
separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and NATO deferred making a decision on 
Georgia’s application for membership in the alliance to a time to be determined in the 
future.  After a meeting in Strasbourg/Kehl on April 4, 2009, the Alliance heads of state 
reaffirmed Georgia’s aspiration to join NATO “one day” in far more guarded form than 
in the previous Bucharest Summit Declaration (Razoux, 2009, p. 7).  The meeting 
concluded with a declaration that implicitly states that “Georgia will not be able to join 
NATO until it has found a peacefully negotiated solution to disagreements between 
Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (p. 7).   
European security as embodied in the European Union and NATO is directly 
affected by Georgia’s ethno-nationalist, separatist wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
As a candidate for NATO membership, the unresolved nature of Georgia’s claims to its 
two separatist areas could spill over into direct conflict between Russia and NATO under 
the mutual security guarantee in Article 5 of the NATO Charter.  In addition to 




bilateral ties with the United States under the auspices of the Georgia Train and Equip 
Program (GTEP), the U.S. Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the 2009 U.S.-Georgia 
Charter on Strategic Partnership (CRS Political, 2009, pp. 4–5).    
This chapter seeks to unravel the mysteries of the Georgian Gordian knot.  The 
chapter examines Georgian nation building and security dilemmas against the backdrop 
of resurgent Russian and growing U.S. and European interests in the region.  The first 
part of the chapter identifies internal challenges facing the Republic of Georgia and 
examines its complex historical past in the context of its relationship with the former 
Soviet Union and the separatist regions.  Georgia’s separatist conflicts date back to the 
early 1990s following the breakup on the Soviet Union and are rooted in ethnic 
differences going back hundreds of years.  These internal conflicts are also directly 
related to the events leading up to the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and have larger 
geo-strategic implications for the United States, NATO, and Russia.   
The second part of the chapter examines Georgia’s internal security challenges in 
the three separatist areas in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ajaria using political scientist 
Ted Gurr’s (1993) theory of ethno-political action (see Figure 2).  Since Georgia’s 
internal separatist wars are closely tied to its external security challenges, explaining the 
causes of separatism using Gurr’s theory of ethno-political action may be one key to 
understanding the Georgian Gordian knot and developing appropriate U.S. and European 
security policies. The concluding section describes Georgia’s efforts to overcome its 
security dilemmas and internal weaknesses by developing strong military, economic, and 




Figure 2.   Georgia’s Separatist Areas in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (From: 
Wikipedia Online, 2009) 
A. DAVID AND GOLIATH: GEORGIA’S SEARCH FOR SECURITY 
UNDER THE SHADOW OF RUSSIAN COLLAPSE AND RUSSIAN 
RESURGENCE  
Since its independence in 1991, and following the “Rose Revolution” in 2003, the 
Georgian government has been single mindedly focused on rebuilding the Georgian state, 
resolving the secessionist conflicts and seeking NATO membership and economic 
integration into the European Union.  In this regard, the Republic of Georgia has faced 
tremendous challenges on several fronts.  Due to its volatile history, varied economic and 
social conditions, and ethnic diversity, it has traditionally been considered by outsiders to 
be an unlikely candidate for integration into Western institutions (CRS, 2008, p. 6).  
Additional internal problems include crime, corruption, terrorism, and narcotics 
trafficking.   
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Georgia’s search for security and independence through alliance with a 
comparatively distant Euro-Atlantic community, despite its proximity and historic ties to 
Russia, has created great internal and external tensions in the region.  Initially, following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was 
established by Russia in December 1991 as a voluntary association loosely based on the 
European Union.  Its membership included Russia and 10 other former Soviet Republics 
and was joined by Georgia in December 1993 and provided for limited defensive 
cooperation and consultation (CIS, 2009, p. 1.3).  While its relations with Russia became 
increasingly difficult, Georgia and Russia did reach a bilateral agreement on closing 
Russian military bases dating back to the Soviet era and all personnel and equipment was 
withdrawn from these sites in December 2007 (p. 2.6).  
Following the August 2008 War, President Saakashvili announced that Georgia 
would leave the CIS and the Georgian Parliament voted unanimously on August 14, 2008 
to withdraw from the regional organization.  This resolution by the Parliament of Georgia 
approving withdrawal from CIS became effective on August 18, 2009.  Since the 2008 
invasion, Russia has continued to occupy Abkhazia and South Ossetia and officially 
recognized the two separatist regions as independent countries on August 26, 2008.  The 
Georgian Parliament passed a resolution declaring Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be 
“Russian-occupied territories” on August 28, 2008 (CIS, 2009, p. 1.3).  
1. The Roots of Conflict  
According to political scientist Christoph Zurcher (2007, p. 11), the geographical 
position and structure of the Caucasus explain two of the most notable peculiarities of the 
region: “the late and weak formation of statehood and the ethno-cultural complexity of 
the region” (see Figure 3).  The Caucasus Mountains form an east-west barrier that 
divides the north from the south in a region traditionally home to a variety of mountain 
tribes that became highly resistant to outside rule.  The difficult terrain made the 




centralized power in the region.  The South Caucasus in particular became a transit 
region, shaped by invasions, migration and retreats to safe havens in the inaccessible 
mountain valleys. 
Not until 1783, under Peter the Great, did the Russian empire begin its conquest 
of the South Caucasus region.  The Russians succeeded in dislodging the Persians and 
Ottomans from the region and the area was annexed into the Russian Empire by 
approximately 1801.  By the early 19th century, the Russians began a pacification 
program in the still unsecured North Caucasus to link the newly annexed territories in the 
South Caucasus to the Empire.  Although the wars in the North Caucasus officially ended 
in 1859 after years of internecine conflict, the region was in a constant state of unrest up 
to the end of the Tsarist period in 1917 (Zurcher, 2007, pp. 16–17).   
The concept of a national agenda and cultural autonomy amongst Georgians did 
not emerge until late in the 19th century.  By this time, the most Georgian upper classes 
had become completely integrated into the Russian service nobility.  After the October 
Revolution in 1917 and the following the withdrawal of Tsarist troops, Georgia (by 
default) declared its independence in May 1918.  However, Bolshevik control was 
reestablished with the advance of the Red Army into the South Caucasus and Georgia 
was incorporated into the Soviet State in 1921 after a brief period of independence 
(Zurcher, 2007, pp. 22–23).  
2. The New Soviet-Georgian State and Ethno-Federalism  
By the mid 1920s, the Soviet Union had consolidated its control over Georgia and 
imposed a political structure that balanced territorial control and ethnicity.  According to 
Zurcher, the purposes of Soviet “ethno-federalism” were:  first, to organize territorial 
authority into administrative units subordinated to a central hierarchy; second, to rein in 
and control nationalistic forces that had been awakened by war and revolution; and third, 
to build legitimacy for the Soviet state by granting at least de jure substantial rights to 




state, according to Zurcher, was an asymmetrical federation comprised of “ethno-
territorial units.”  Each unit was delegated a certain amount of autonomy and privileges, 
which differed according to the status of the unit.   
At the top of this hierarchy were Union republics established on the basis of 
international borders, significant non-Russian population, and sufficient socio-cultural 
development.  Under this scheme, Georgia became its own Union Republic (SSR).  The 
Abkhazia and Ajaria were eventually combined with Georgia in 1930 to become 
Autonomous Republics (ASSR).  Autonomous republics were subunits of union republics 
and consisted of ethnic groups numerically smaller than the “titular” nations of the union 
republic.  South Ossetia was founded as an Autonomous Oblast (AO) within Georgia.  
The AO was a third tier region within a union republic that represented a numerically 
small ethnic group settled in a relatively compact area of settlement.  From 1936 until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, this state structure remained essentially unchanged and was 
dominated at the center in Moscow by the Communist Party (CPSU) (Zurcher, 2007, p. 
25).   
This Soviet system of administrative-territorial control that linked certain groups 
with a given territory may have laid the groundwork for modern nation-statehood in 
Georgia.  Up to the Soviet period, collective identity had been rooted in kinship, clan and 
regional and religious ties or in cities such as Tbilisi, allegiance to (Soviet) class 
consciousness.  According to Zurcher, the concept of nation or nationality came to the 
Caucasus as a byproduct of its incorporation into the Soviet system (p. 31).  However, he 
argues that although these Soviet-style sovereign nation-states looked “modern,” they 
were in fact only quasi nation-states.  In his words, “…their parliaments had little 
influence, their borders little meaning, their symbols little allure and their freedom to 
maneuver was tightly restricted by the central hierarchies of the Soviet Union” (p. 32).  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the institutions in which quasi-sovereignty 
resided and the ethnic and political struggles that followed became the foundations of the 
current Georgian state. 
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3. Post-Soviet Realities: Internal Political Turmoil, the “Rose 
Revolution,” and the Separatist Wars      
The Republic of Georgia was initially established under the shadow of the 
transformation of the collapsing Soviet super-state into the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) in 1991.  After a period of political turmoil and internal wars 
against separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a new leadership emerged 
out of the “Rose Revolution” in 2003, which sought to create a modern nation-state 
independent of Russian influence, integrated into the European Union, and aligned with 
the United States and NATO.  The “Rose Revolution” of November 2003, which 
involved thousands of Georgian public protests against massive fraud in parliamentary 
elections, led to the resignation of then President Eduard Shevardnadze (Lynch, 2006, pp. 
9–10).   
Since then, Georgia has launched itself into the process of democracy and state 
building under the energetic leadership of President Mikheil Saakashvili with the support 
of the majority of the population.  According to Cornell (2007), Saakashvili was able to 
market Georgia successfully as a “beacon of democracy” in the post-Soviet space (p. 7). 
Meanwhile, in Moscow, the Georgian revolution was regarded with fear and dismay.  
Cornell maintains that from 1999 onwards, Russia increasingly moved in a nationalistic 
direction and sought to manipulate Georgia’s territorial conflicts to undermine its 
stability and development (p. 31).  
However, increased political instability in Georgia in 2007 also raised doubts in 
the United States and NATO about the Saakashvili administration and its commitment to 
democratization.  Several opposition parties launched demonstrations in 2007 demanding 
a change in legislative elections and calling for Saakashvili’s resignation.  These 
demonstrations were forcibly dispersed by security forces.  Saakashvili declared a state of 
emergency with enhanced powers for 15 days in November and maintained that the 
demonstrations were part of a Russian coup attempt (CRS Political, 2009, p. 25).  
Presidential elections were held in January 2008 and Saakashvili won 53% of the vote 
against five opposition candidates.  A legislative election was held in May 2008 with 12  
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different parties and blocs competing for 150 seats.  International observers and the 
OSCE assessed these elections as “broadly meeting its standards, but with some troubling 
irregularities” (p. 26).   
Following the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, President Saakashvili 
announced new democratization initiatives meant to strengthen Georgian independence.  
Opposition calls for renewed demonstrations, new elections, and Saakashvili’s 
resignation resulted in arrests of opposition figures and renewed accusations of a coup in 
the planning.  In addition to the elections in 2008, a plebiscite was held that endorsed 
Georgia’s aim to join NATO (CRS Political, 2009, p. 26).  According to Dov Lynch 
(2006) at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Georgia’s continued 
democratization is particularly important to the West. He asserts, “The Georgian project 
is important because it reflects the core challenge of crafting democracy in a 
dysfunctional state embedded in a conflict-ridden region” (p. 10). 
Georgia has fought several separatist conflicts since its independence.  In 1990, 
Georgia fought to prevent the secession of the South Ossetia region, leading to 
approximately 1,500 deaths and tens of thousands of mostly ethnic Georgian displaced 
persons (CRS, 2008, p. 6).  In 1992, Georgia fought another separatist movement in the 
Abkhaz region.  This conflict resulted in about 10,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands 
of displaced persons, mostly ethnic Georgians.  At the end of 2005, the UNHCR reported 
that there were 234,000 displaced persons in Georgia (p. 6).  A third separatist movement 
in Georgia’s southern Ajaria region, inhabited by Islamic ethnic Georgians, was 
successfully resolved after a crisis in 2004 and is discussed further in the second part of 
the chapter.   
Although ceasefires had been declared for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, neither 
had developed beyond the fragile confidence building stage when war broke out with 
Russia in August 2008 in South Ossetia and expanded into Abkhazia.  In a six-point 
peace plan negotiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Russia agreed to withdraw 
its troops from positions in Georgia proper, but continues to occupy the separatist areas 
of Georgia and has recognized the two breakaway regions as independent nations 
(Allison, 2008, pp. 1159–1161).  The current Saakashvili government effort to reassert 
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Georgian authority in the southwestern autonomous republic of Ajaria led to a major 
crisis that was successfully resolved early in 2004.  This success in Ajaria may have 
encouraged Saakashvili to intensify his efforts, without success, in the breakaway region 
of South Ossetia and resulting in direct conflict with Russia in 2008 (Rayfield, 2008, pp. 
2–5).  Since the August 2008 invasion by Russia over the issue of separatist areas, the 
Republic of Georgia must now painfully reexamine its approach to security and nation 
building.  
4. Economic and Energy Challenges 
Georgia’s security and independence are also tied to its economic and energy 
resources.  It does possess some mineral resources, but does not produce mineral 
products in quantities of more than regional significance (Levine, 2006).  However, due 
to its relatively rich agricultural production of wines, alcoholic beverages, and citrus 
fruits combined with its Black Sea coast tourist industry and black market economy, it 
managed to have a much higher living standard during the Soviet period than most other 
Soviet republics.   
Of more recent importance to Georgia’s economy is the building of an east-west 
energy transportation corridor through its territory that links the Caspian Sea and Central 
Asian oil and natural gas to Western Europe.  Newly constructed oil and gas pipelines 
completed during the late 1990s include the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the 
South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCP).  These pipelines are crucial to Georgia’s future and 
reduces its dependence on Russian gas and oil while at the same time making Georgia a 
transit region for westward-bound energy.  In addition, these pipelines directly threaten 
Russian control over key energy transfers to Western Europe because they bypass 
Russian territory. U.S. and European interests have encouraged Georgian economic and 
energy independence through private ventures, as well as military and economic support 




Figure 3.   Ethno-linguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region (From: Wikipedia Online, 
2009) 
B. ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND GEORGIA’S SEPARATIST WARS 
Since its declaration of sovereignty in March 1990, Georgia has fought three 
separatist wars.  This includes the 2008 war, which resulted in outside intervention by 
Russia, in support of separatist groups in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and established 
autonomous, semi-independent entities in the two breakaway regions (see Figure 2).  A 
third separatist movement in Ajaria was peacefully resolved in 2004.  Russia’s recent 
invasion of the Republic of Georgia in August 2008, in support of the separatist areas of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, demonstrates that ethno-nationalist threats continue to 
present challenges to Georgia’s security and independence.  Furthermore, Moscow is able 
to undermine the prospects for Georgian membership in NATO by aggravating Georgia’s 
unresolved territorial conflicts and highlighting the issues of confrontation with Russia.   
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This section of the thesis seeks to explore the conditions that may have 
contributed to political mobilization of communal groups in Georgia’s separatist areas in 
the context of theories of ethno-political action.  The chapter also briefly considers other 
sources of separatist violence that may have contributed to the success or failure of 
Georgia’s three separatist movements, such as economic, political, psychological, or 
social-psychological factors.  A final section of the thesis evaluates the prospects for 
resolving these separatist conflicts through the institutional framework provided by 
NATO membership.   
1. Theories of Ethno-Political Action: Why Minorities Rebel  
In his general theory of ethno-political action, political scientist Ted R. Gurr 
(1993) maintains that most theories of conflict analysis focus on two principal, competing 
perspectives of relative deprivation and group mobilization (p. 123).  The relative 
deprivation theory holds that peoples’ discontent about unjust deprivation is their primary 
motivation for political action.  In contrast, the group mobilization theory stresses 
leaders’ calculated mobilization of group resources in response to changing political 
opportunities.  Gurr maintains that mobilization and strategy of politically active ethnic 
groups is based on an interaction of both of these factors.  This combination of shared 
grievances and a strong sense of group identity and common interest is the fuel that can 
spark spontaneous political action and sustained conflict (p. 124).  
In Gurr’s (1993) analysis, four predisposing traits shape disadvantaged communal 
group’s sense of grievance and affect their potential for acting on it.  Significantly, in the 
case of Georgia, this theory applies not only to disadvantaged groups, but can also 
potentially apply to advantaged minorities whenever they are threatened by the loss of 
advantages, such as in the case of Abkhazia.  The four traits in Gurr’s analysis that 
predispose communities to political action are (pp. 124–129) the following:  
• The extent of collective disadvantage 
• The salience of group identity 
• The extent of group cohesion and mobilization 
• The repressive control by dominant groups 
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This analysis attempts to apply these four criteria to the Georgian separatist areas 
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ajaria, and draw conclusions about ethno-political 
conflict and implications for U.S. and European security and appropriate engagement 
strategies. 
2. Ethno-political Conflict in Abkhazia: The Advantaged Minority   
The Republic of Georgia has a multinational population.  In 1989, it had 5.4 
million inhabitants of whom 70 percent were Georgians, 8 percent Armenians, 6.3 
percent Russians, 5.7 percent Azeris, 3 percent Ossetians, and 1.8 percent Abkhazians 
(Zurcher, 2007, p. 117).  There are three autonomous, ethnically defined regions within 
Georgia: the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia in the north and the Autonomous 
Regions of Abkhazia and Ajaria in the west, on the Black Sea coast (see Figure 2).  
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia was an Autonomous Republic 
within the Georgian (Soviet Socialist) Republic (SSR) with a population of 525,000 
inhabitants.  The Abkhazians are a minority in their own breakaway area comprising only 
17.8 percent of the total population with Georgians making up the largest ethnic group at 
45.7 percent, followed by 14.6 percent Armenians, and 14.3 percent Russians (Zurcher, 
2007, p. 119).   
a.  The Extent of Collective Disadvantage 
According to Gurr (1993), the extent of a communal group’s collective 
disadvantage vis-à-vis other groups is a principal source of its members’ grievances and 
perceptions that they have a common interest in collective action (p. 126).  During Soviet 
times, Abkhaz fear of Georgian demographic and political dominance and competition 
over resources led to compensatory measures from Moscow that led to the Abkhazians 
gaining disproportionate access to resources and key political positions.  By 1990, 
Abkhazians controlled 67 percent of key government positions and most of the economy 
(Zurcher, 2007, p. 119).  After the Soviet collapse, increasing Georgian nationalist 
rhetoric threatened to reduce Abkhazian regional autonomy and privileges within the 
confines of a new Georgian state and decrease its collective advantage. 
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b.  The Salience of Group Identity 
Gurr (1993) maintains that a sense of common identity must be strong 
enough to overcome more narrow loyalties to clan, class, and communities within the 
group (p. 126).  The Abkhazian language group belongs to a different family of 
languages than the Georgian group.  There are both Muslim and Orthodox (Christian) 
believers among the Abkhazian population.  After the Soviet collapse, when the 
nationalist tide grew stronger among both Abkhazians and Georgians, each group began 
to promote its discourse about past injustices.  Fears of ethnic discrimination, Abkhazian 
special privileges, and nationalist rhetoric on both sides fueled separatist agendas and 
strengthened group identities.   
c.  The Extent of Group Cohesion and Mobilization 
Mobilization is defined by Gurr (1993) as the extent to which group 
members are prepared to commit their energies and resources to collective action on 
behalf of their common interests (p. 127).  Due to the Soviet system of ethno-federalism, 
the Abkhazians were already well prepared for collective political action.  Throughout 
the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, Abkhazian cultural movements, the intelligentsia, and 
communist party functionaries had been pushing Moscow to integrate Abkhazia into 
Russia (RSFSR).  Before independence, in June 1988, some 58 key Abkhazian 
Communist leaders had requested uncoupling of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR 
(Zurcher, 2007, p. 120).  Georgian nationalist threats increased Abkhazian cohesion and 
mobilization efforts to separate.     
d.  The Repressive Control by Dominant Groups 
Gurr (1993) holds that to the extent that a group’s disadvantages (or 
advantages) have been established by force, its grievances and identity are intensified 
(pp. 128–129).  A mass demonstration in Abkhazia took place in March 1989, promoting 
Abkhazian status as a union republic (Soviet) and implying succession from Georgia.  
The Georgian nationalist movement reacted to this Abkhazian mobilization with mass 
demonstrations combining anti-communist and anti-Abkhazian slogans.  Violent 
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suppression of demonstrations resulted in radicalization of nationalist forces on both 
sides, and moderate voices were almost completely sidelined.  Nationalist rhetoric greatly 
troubled minorities that had regional autonomy within Georgia and added to their fears of 
Georgian dominance.  
Gurr’s theory of ethno-political action does provide a useful framework 
for understanding the Abkhazian separatist movement.  In this case, the advantaged 
minority demonstrated a combination of shared grievances and a strong sense of group 
identity that may have sparked political action and sustained the conflict.  Gurr’s four 
criteria also help explain how a disadvantaged communal group’s sense of grievance 
created potential for acting on it once their privileged (minority) autonomous status was 
threatened.  
3. Ethno-political Conflict in South Ossetia: The Disadvantaged 
Majority 
After Abkhazia, the second breakaway area to emerge from the Georgian search 
for independence was South Ossetia.  South Ossetia had a population of 100,000 of 
whom 66.2 percent are Ossetian and 29 percent are Georgian (Zurcher, 2007, p. 124).  
Until 1988, problems between the two groups were relatively stress free.  However, in 
1989, increasing Georgian nationalism began to create tensions and push South Ossetia 
along the same path as Abkhazia.  In this case, however, it was a disadvantaged Ossetian 
majority seeking to prevent relative deprivation resulting from a loss of autonomy that 
mobilized political opposition to an increasingly nationalistic Georgian state.   
a.  The Extent of Collective Disadvantage 
In the case of South Ossetia, language and desire for greater autonomy 
were key determinants in the development of feelings of collective disadvantage vis-à-vis 
other groups.  A war of laws escalated in 1989 when the Ossetians countered a Georgian 
law making Georgian the official language in South Ossetia.  The Georgian nationalist 
movement used increasing tensions to mobilize demonstrations in South Ossetia resulting 
in violent clashes and contributing to South Ossetian fears of Georgian domination.  
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Consequently, South Ossetia appealed to the Kremlin for an increase in its autonomy.  
Georgian nationalist opposition perceived these initiatives by South Ossetia as a step 
toward secession and a threat to the goal of Georgian independence.   
In August 1990, the Georgian Supreme Soviet passed a law that reduced 
participation of regional groups and excluded South Ossetian parties from participating in 
elections.  The collective disadvantage of the South Ossetians as a group became a 
principal source of grievance that led to the development of common interest in collective 
action.  This action resulted in South Ossetian regional authorities proclaiming South 
Ossetia a Democratic Soviet Republic and requesting Moscow that it remain a part of the 
Soviet Union.  The Georgian parliament declared this action invalid and suspended the 
autonomous status of the region (Zurcher, 2007, pp. 124–127).    
b.  The Salience of Group Identity 
The salience of common identity among South Ossetians would not appear 
to be particularly strong.  Although Ossetians comprise 66.2 percent of the region’s 
population, about one-half of all families in South Ossetia are of mixed Georgian and 
Ossetian origin.  Furthermore, about 100,000 Ossetians live outside the region in other 
parts of Georgia.  An additional 335,000 Ossetians live in North Ossetia, which now 
belongs to the Russian Federation and is linked with South Ossetia by a tunnel running 
through the Caucasus Mountains (Zurcher, 2007, p. 124).  One source of group cohesion 
is the Ossetian language, which is related to a different family than the Georgian 
language group.  The majority of Ossetians are Orthodox Christians, while a minority is 
Sunni Muslim.   
The source of the South Ossetian group identity sufficient to overcome 
narrower loyalties may have developed relatively recently, rather than through long 
standing historical animosity.  Between 1918 and 1921, Menshevik-ruled Georgia 
violently suppressed a Bolshevik revolt of the Ossetians.  According to Zurcher (2007), 
this event may have had a significant effect on the “…Ossetian discourse on the wrongs 
suffered throughout the group’s history” (p. 124).  He maintains that relations between 
Georgians and Ossetians living in South Ossetia were mostly amicable until the 
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beginning of the breakup of the Soviet Union in the late 1988.  Despite this lack of a 
strong South Ossetian group identity, shared grievances and the threat of repressive 
control by a dominant group may have strengthened group cohesion.   
c.  The Extent of Group Cohesion and Mobilization  
In response to the decision of the South Ossetian Legislature to increase 
regional autonomy within Georgia in 1989, Georgian nationalists mobilized and bused 
30,000 Georgian protest demonstrators to the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali 
(Zurcher, p. 125).  Clashes followed, which resulted in the formation of the first South 
Ossetian militias to counter the Georgian nationalist forces.  Although the extent of group 
cohesion and mobilization in South Ossetia does not appear to be high, increasingly 
nationalistic actions by Georgian authorities to thwart Ossetian desire for greater 
autonomy and poor control over the newly formed Georgian National Guard units may 
have had the combined effect of increasing South Ossetian cohesion and mobilization.    
d.  The Repressive Control by Dominant Groups 
In 1991, the Georgian government imposed an economic blockade on 
South Ossetia and cut off the supply of electricity and gas (Zurcher, p. 125).  This 
blockade was followed by an attack on Tskhinvali by elements of the newly formed 
Georgian National Guard and local militias, which were accused of looting and attacks on 
the local population.  The Georgian paramilitary forces were forced to retreat from the 
area after a few weeks of intensive clashes with increasingly determined and better 
organized South Ossetian militia.  Attempts at repressive control and unjust deprivation 
by Georgian nationalist forces had resulted in group mobilization and increasing political 
opposition by South Ossetian forces. 
Gurr’s theory of ethno-political action also provides a useful framework 
for understanding the South Ossetian separatist movement.  In this case, the 
disadvantaged Ossetian majority demonstrated that although its group identity did not 
appear particularly strong, a common language and a desire for collective autonomy were 
key determinants in the development of a feeling of collective disadvantage vis-à-vis 
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other groups.  Moreover, repressive control by a potentially dominant Georgian group 
could have led to greater group mobilization and cohesion where group identification had 
been weak.   
4. Ethno-political Conflict in Ajaria: Language Trumps Ethnicity   
Ajaria is the third autonomous territory within the territory of the Republic of 
Georgia.  It has a population of 392,000 of whom 86 percent are Georgian, 8 percent 
Russian, and 4 percent Armenian.  It is estimated that approximately 67 percent or 
250,000 of the Georgians living in Ajaria are, in fact, Ajar Muslims (Zurcher, p. 206).  
However, due to the fact that Muslim Ajars speak a version of Georgian, they were 
classified by Soviet demographers as Georgian, and therefore, not considered a distinct 
ethnic group.  Soviet passports reported ethnicity, but not religious affiliation.  Since 
Soviet ideology did not allow religion to be an indicator of ethnic difference, the 
Georgian communist authorities were able to pursue an effective Georgianization 
program.  By 1980, most Ajars spoke Georgian, and due to the politics of Soviet 
secularization, Ajars and Georgians were brought closer together culturally, although 
Ajars continue to maintain many aspects of traditional, Muslim culture.   
Despite this cultural alignment, Georgian nationalism did in fact also threaten 
Ajaria’s autonomy.  Some historians have maintained that violent conflict was avoided 
because not enough cultural difference existed between Georgians and Ajars to motivate 
Ajars to seek independence.  This school holds that Moscow’s policies had allowed 
Georgia to pursue an assimilationist policy there and prevented Ajar cultural identity 
from becoming politically relevant.  Using Gurr’s criteria, the extent of relative 
deprivation (threat) combined with group mobilization never reached the critical 
threshold in Ajaria.  Therefore, the crucial difference in the three separatist movements 
was that South Ossetian and Abkhaz identity became ethnicized, and Ajar identity did 
not.   
Still other sources point to the historical importance of circumstance in the Ajaria 
case, for instance, when one of the principal nationalist Georgian proponents in favor of 
abolishing Ajaria’s autonomy was killed and/or the critical role of Russian peacekeepers 
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in the Ajaria.  Zurcher (2007) argues that although the above ethnically based arguments 
go a long way in explaining Ajaria’s stability, a critical factor was the mobilization of 
Ajars under the influential leadership of Aslan Abashidze (p. 206).  Abashidze ruled 
Ajaria as a personal fiefdom, and convincingly was able to guarantee Ajars that civil 
strife would not materialize from Georgian ultranationalist and private militias.  
Abashidze’s highly personal reign over Ajaria was supported by a consensus among the 
population, and his militias were very effective at guarding Ajaria’s internal border with 
Georgia from nationalist militias and providing internal security.  In the final analysis, 
Zurcher maintains that Ajaria remained stable, not only because of the non-politicized 
nature of the cultural differences between Ajars and Georgians, but also thanks to a 
regime based on a high level of elite continuity, well-established networks of patronage, 
and was supported by an informal power and revenue sharing agreement between the 
patrons of Ajaria and Georgia (p. 208). 
Gurr’s theory of ethno-political action provides a useful conceptual model for 
explaining the causes of separatism in Georgia’s three breakaway areas.  In the case of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a potent combination of perceived collective disadvantage 
to threats of Georgian control and repression generated greater group cohesion and 
mobilization that led to war.  In the case of Ajaria, it is not clear if language trumped 
ethnicity or if unique historical circumstances intervened to prevent a separatist conflict 
there.  Although the causes of Georgia’s separatist conflicts discussed in this chapter have 
concentrated on largely internal factors, other external factors have also played a pivotal 
role in undermining efforts at conflict resolution, state formation, and democratization in 
the region.  The following chapters examine these external factors in detail.   
C. CONCLUSION:  THE GEORGIAN GORDIAN KNOT AND EUROPEAN 
SECURITY 
Since its founding in 1991, the Republic of Georgia has provided a challenging 
model for the exploration of the issues concerning European security and ethno-
nationalism.  Probably the most difficult challenge to the Republic of Georgia is 
resolving its internal separatist wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  In this regard, the 
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lessons of the cases presented here support the importance of ethnic demography in 
increasing the risk of internal wars.  Specifically, it points to the heightened risk of 
escalation where one group is able to assert its dominance within “its” territory at the 
expense of other groups to maintain its privileged access to resources and key political 
positions.  However, other explanations, such as a combination of more creative policies 
associated with regional autonomy, assimilation, pluralism, power sharing, and 
leadership dynamics, were also critical in determining the success or failure of Georgia’s 
separatist movements.   
Unfortunately, the lessons learned through the cases presented here are likely to 
be frozen in place for the foreseeable future as a result of the August 2008 Russian-
Georgian conflict.  The most authoritative investigation into the causes of the conflict, 
which has brought relations between Russia and the West to a post-Cold War low, was 
completed by the European Union Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia in October 2009.  After a lengthy inquiry, investigators concluded 
that Georgia initiated last year’s war with Russia by attacking separatists in South Ossetia 
and rejected the Georgian government’s claim that the attack was defensive.  However, 
this finding was balanced by the conclusion that Russia created and exploited the 
conditions that led to war (EUIIFFCM, 2009, p. 10). 
Russia’s continued occupation and subsequent recognition of Georgia‘s two 
separatist areas as sovereign nations continue to present challenges to European security 
and NATO for the foreseeable future.  A 2009 meeting of Alliance heads of state 
reaffirmed Georgia’s aspiration to join NATO “one day.”  However, implicitly, the 
Declaration states that “Georgia will not be able to join NATO until it has found a 
peaceful negotiated solution to the disagreement between Russia, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia (Razoux, 2009, p. 7).  The proponents of NATO enlargement maintain that the 
Russian intervention in August 2008 would have been deterred by Georgia’s membership 
in the Alliance and that its internal conflicts would have been attenuated through the 




was able to undermine the prospects for Georgian membership in NATO by aggravating 
Tbilisi’s unresolved territorial conflicts and highlighting the issues of confrontation with 
Russia.  
Critics of NATO’s enlargement maintain that Alliance membership for Georgia is 
provocative in that it risks war with Russia at a time when NATO is already preoccupied 
and divided by a protracted war in Afghanistan.  They maintain that a U.S. policy of 
unlimited support for Georgia’s NATO membership has encouraged an assertive 
Georgian nationalist policy in the separatist areas (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) vis-à-vis 
Russia that reduces incentives for peaceful conflict resolution.  In this regard, NATO 
membership is viewed by the Saakashvili regime primarily as a means to protect the 
country from Russia, not as a means to boost internal reform and development in its 
separatist areas (Razoux, 2009, p. 7). 
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III. U.S. INTERESTS AND THE GEORGIAN GORDIAN KNOT 
The security and success of the Republic of Georgia is important to U.S. interests.  
Not only is it a key strategic pivot for transportation of energy resources, but it also 
represents a possible model for successful state-building and democratic development in 
both the former Soviet Union and the Middle East region as a whole.  According to 
Svante Cornell (2007) at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, the United States has three 
inter-linked sets of interests in the South Caucasus and Georgia, specifically:  
[First] The building of Georgia’s statehood and democracy is important 
both symbolically and practically; [second] the growing scarcity of energy 
supplies makes the Caucasus a critical bottleneck; and [third] the 
increasing importance of the South Caucasus in regional security matters 
(p. 16).  
The United States has pursued close ties with Georgia ever since the pro-Western 
former Soviet foreign minister, President Eduard Shevardnadze assumed power in 1992.  
Faced with calls for support, President H. W. Bush and Congress extended U.S. aid to 
Georgia under the FREEDOM Support Act in October 1992.  Since then, the U.S. 
relationship with Georgia has continued to grow under the Georgia Train and Equip 
Program (GTEP), the Millennium Challenge Account, and other economic and energy 
initiatives from 1992 to 2005.  In congressional testimony in March 2005, Gen. James 
Jones, then head of United States European Command (USEUCOM), stated that: 
The Caucasus is increasingly important to our interests.  Its air corridor 
has become a crucial lifeline between coalition forces in Afghanistan and 
our bases in Europe.  Caspian [Sea] oil, carried through the Caucasus, may 
constitute as much as 25 percent of the world’s growth in oil production 
over the next five years…this region is a geographical pivot point in the 
spread of democracy and free market economies to the states of Central 
and Southwest Asia. (CRS, 2008, p. 28)   
In June 2006, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza stated that the 
United States has numerous sets of inter-related of interests in the Caucasus.  These 
interests include energy, traditional security interests, such as fighting terrorism,  
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preventing military conflict, and in some cases, restoring or preserving the territorial 
integrity of the states of the region, and lastly, promoting democratic and market 
economic reform (CRS Political, 2009, p. 2).   
Against this background and because of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, some 
area specialists and policy makers have questioned whether U.S. interests in Georgia are 
important enough to risk confrontation with Moscow over the wider set of issues facing 
U.S.-Russian relations.  They also urge caution in adopting policies heavily involving the 
United States in a region beset by ethnic and civil conflicts.  Dmitri Trenin (2008) at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warns that a Georgia in NATO risks direct 
confrontation with Moscow (p. 6).   
Despite its policy statements of support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, and 
democratic and market economic reforms, the Bush administration demonstrated that 
ultimately, it did not consider Georgia worth a military confrontation with Moscow 
during the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.  Shortly after the conflict, U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates stressed that he was not predicting a return to the Cold War, and 
maintained that, overall, the U.S. response to the crisis had been restrained.  “The United 
States spent 45 years working very hard to avoid a military confrontation with Russia,” 
Mr. Gates said [and] “I see no reason to change that approach today” (Myers, 2008, p. 2).  
Still, not much is known about the U.S. diplomacy in that crisis and whether the Russians 
decided not to occupy Tbilisi because of some kind of a warning from the U.S., or 
because of some other considerations.  Unfortunately, this will not be known until the 
relevant documents are declassified. 
Other observers argue that U.S. policy now requires more active engagement in 
the region to strengthen Georgian independence and “contain” Russian and Iranian 
influence, as well as reduce the threat of Islamic extremism.  Cornell (2007) and Cohen 
(2009) advocate strengthened U.S. commitment to Georgia’s NATO membership and the 
development of a proactive rather than reactive U.S. policy.  Cornell maintains that 
current U.S. appeasement policies have emboldened an increasingly assertive and 
aggressive Russian policy (p. 35).  This continuing debate between advocates of 
containment and the realist power balancing schools may be a reflection of the inherent 
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contradiction between the promotion of U.S. principles abroad and the reality of world 
politics and narrower security interests on the ground.  The following section of the thesis 
examines the nature and extent of U.S. engagement policy with the Republic of Georgia 
since establishing its independence in 1991. 
A. U.S. ENGAGEMENT POLICY AND GEORGIA 
To deal with these threats and challenges to the Georgian nation-building project, 
the current U.S. policy includes security assistance to train and equip Georgian military 
forces and programs to improve human rights, political, and economic reform.  Georgia 
has been a “premier partner” in the Global War on Terrorism and provided troops for 
coalition operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the past Administration 
viewed Georgia as a model for free market democratic reform and a “close partner” in 
supporting U.S. democratization goals in Soviet successor states.  The U.S. security 
assistance to Georgia for the time period FY1992–FY2007, including law enforcement 
was $542.27 million (CRS Security, 2009, p. 39).  In addition to this assistance, the U.S. 
has advocated NATO membership for Georgia and this was a source of disagreement 
within the alliance at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008.     
In addition to security assistance and support for Georgia’s NATO membership, 
the current U.S. engagement policy toward the Republic of Georgia involves a high level 
of military, political, and economic assistance.  Total U.S. foreign aid to Georgia for the 
time period between FY1992–FY2008 was $1,898.64 million or almost two billion 
dollars over a 16-year period (CRS Political, 2009, p. 35).  In the aftermath of its short, 
disastrous war with Russia in August 2008, the U.S. has committed an additional $1 
billion in combined military, humanitarian, and economic assistance to rebuild the 
Republic of Georgia (CRS Security, 2009, p. 3).  This infusion would make Georgia one 
of the largest recipients of American foreign aid after Israel and Egypt and is viewed by 
some observers as part of a strategy of “soft containment” of Russian influence in the 
region. 
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1. U.S. Support for Georgia’s NATO Membership  
In 1994, Georgia became one of the first former Soviet republics to join the 
Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) as part of a policy designed to bring it into eventual 
membership in NATO.  In 2004, the North Atlantic Council approved the first Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) for Georgia.  The Individual Partnership Action Plans 
(IPAPs) are open to countries that have the political will and ability to deepen their 
relationship with NATO.  The IPAP program requires signatories to complete military 
and civil-military reforms.  If the IPAP were successful, Georgia would have good 
opportunity to be granted Membership Action Plan (MAP) status, which is usually 
considered one of the final steps on the way to NATO membership (CRS Security, 2009, 
pp. 24–25).  
NATO membership provides a security guarantee under Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty calling for the collective defense of any member attacked by a non-
NATO country.  The security guarantee offered to all NATO members under Article 5 
was invoked for the first time in NATO’s history after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the 
United States.  This attack was considered an attack on a NATO member nation, and 
subsequently, generated the support of all members for the U.S. Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.  At the December 2001 Bonn Conference, the 
International Security Force Afghanistan (ISAF) was created under the authority of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (UNSCR 1386) with forces and assets 
from 18 other countries. In 2003, NATO assumed the leadership of the ISAF operation 
(NATO, 2009).   
Significantly for Georgia, the credibility of the security guarantee under Article 5 
(if it were a NATO member) has been weakened by a system of  national “caveats,” 
where contributing members’ combat role is strictly proscribed by national legislatures at 
home based on domestic political support for the war [against terrorist organizations] in 
Afghanistan.  Such a system of national caveats could weaken the credibility of NATO’s 
security guarantee to Georgia if it were admitted to the alliance and attacked by a major 
power such as Russia.  
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In fact, whether to grant MAP status to Georgia was a matter of contention at the 
April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest.  In the end, the Alliance pledged that Georgia 
and Ukraine would eventually become members of  NATO (CRS Security, 2009, p. 25).  
In the wake of the Russia-Georgian conflict in August 2008, the United States agreed to a 
British plan to not push for MAP status for Georgia at the December 2008 NATO foreign 
ministerial meeting.  Instead, it was agreed to develop an Annual Action Program (AAP) 
for Ukraine and Georgia.  Under this confusing formula, the two countries would be able 
to work towards Alliance membership without formally undertaking the MAP, but they 
would still be tasked with meeting the requirements of the MAP.  The allies also agreed 
to set up work within the NATO-Georgia Council to facilitate Georgia’s eventual NATO 
membership, and to prepare annual reports on Georgia’s progress toward eventual 
membership. 
The NATO foreign ministers wrapped up the Brussels meeting in December 2008 
with a “broad agreement” on policy towards Georgia and Russia.  However, the 
agreement failed to resolve Georgia’s “strategic predicament,” in that it deferred a final 
decision on Georgia’s membership.  The current U.S. administration still supports the 
continued Georgian push for membership, despite strong opposition from France, 
Germany, and Italy.  The compromise plan worked out by the United Kingdom offers the 
possibility of eventual Georgian membership, but avoids giving Tbilisi the MAP and 
calls for maintenance of an “intensified dialogue” with the Alliance.  The intensified 
dialogue is a non-binding arrangement, which may or may not lead to full membership 
(Oxford Analytica, 2008, p. 2).   
The issue of Georgia’s NATO membership does raise important issues concerning 
the nature of the alliance, its credibility, and what constitutes an ally.  In testimony before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Assistant Secretary of State, Daniel Fried, 





Senator Warner…That leads me to the question of commitments, so to 
speak, to bring about admission of Georgia and the Ukraine into NATO.  
Once in NATO, you have Article 5, which says an attack on one is an 
attack on all.  Had Georgia been in NATO, I assume Article 5 would have 
required NATO to join Georgia with the actual use of force in defending 
its sovereignty.  Would that be correct?  
Secretary Fried. Yes. (U.S. Senate, 2008, p. 29) 
A second related issue about the nature of national commitments and NATO 
security guarantees was addressed during the same Senate Hearings on “The Current 
Situation in Georgia and Implications for U.S. Policy,” regarding the issue of national 
caveats.  The issue of national caveats has been a particularly contentious issue within 
NATO and its participation in ISAF in Afghanistan.  In a speech at the Munich 
Conference on Security Policy in Munich in 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates asserted 
that the alliance is at risk of becoming a “two-tiered alliance of those who are willing to 
fight and those who are not.  Such a development with all its implications for collective 
security, would effectively destroy the alliance” (p. 30).  In U.S. Senate Hearings, 
Senator Warner echoed the Defense Secretary’s comments and maintained that the issue 
of national caveats could be “particularly troublesome” with regard to Georgia if it were a 
member of NATO (p. 30). 
A third contentious issue relating to Georgia’s NATO aspirations is related to the 
true nature of a mutual defensive alliance and the security responsibilities required of all 
its members.  At the same September 2008 Senate Hearings on “U.S. Policy and 
Georgia,” Senator James Webb maintained that had Georgia been a member of NATO in 
August 2008, the United States would have had a different set of responsibilities. Senator 
Webb also alluded to the connection between NATO membership and Georgia’s internal 
and external conflicts being similar to the sort of entanglements that preceded World War 
I” (U.S. Senate, 2008, p. 42).  He pointed to the long history of instability in the Caucasus 
and asserted that: 
We need to be very careful in sorting out what is an alliance and what is 
not.  If you look at the movement in NATO [eastward], I think if we were 
to apply historical terms we have been bringing in a series of protectorates 
in traditional terms rather than allies.  You would define an ally as a nation 
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that actually bolsters your security or your collective security by joining.  
A lot of these countries [such as Georgia], it’s hard to imagine their 
meeting that standard. (p. 42) 
Georgia does in fact contribute to both U.S. and NATO security through participation of 
its armed forces in both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and as part of ISAF in 
Afghanistan.  
The discussion at the September 2008 Senate Hearings on “U.S. Policy and 
Georgia” goes to the core of the debate about NATO’s evolving role as a defensive 
alliance in a post-Soviet world.  NATO was originally created primarily as a military 
alliance designed to contain the Soviet expansion into Western Europe.  However, its 
secondary role was to create an institutional framework in which the national rivalries 
within Europe, which had resulted in centuries of wars, could be resolved.  Many 
proponents of NATO enlargement maintain that this has proven to be an extremely 
effective mechanism for resolving disputes between nations and many of the disputes in 
Central and Eastern Europe have tended to be attenuated through the NATO membership 
process.  Such a process does, however, presuppose that Russia is a NATO partner, not 
an adversary.  Although not unique, Georgia’s distant location in the Caucasus region and 
the unresolved nature of its separatist movements with a major non-NATO regional 
power does create exceptional challenges for the management of national rivalries within 
NATO’s current institutional framework.  
2. The U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership 
Since the Russia-Georgia conflict and the American presidential elections in 
2008, strong U.S. support for Georgia was reflected in the new U.S.-Georgia Charter on 
Strategic Partnership, signed in January 2009.  This agreement states that “our two 
countries share a vital interest in a strong, independent, sovereign, unified, and 
democratic Georgia” (CRS Political, 2009, p. 4).  More specifically, in the security realm, 
the agreement states U.S.-Georgian intent to expand the scope of their ongoing defense 
and security cooperation programs and to promote peace and global stability.  The 
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agreement also states that such cooperation will “increase Georgian capabilities and 
…strengthen Georgia’s candidacy for NATO membership” (CRS Political, 2009, p. 4).   
At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony on Georgia held on August 4, 
2009, on the anniversary of the Russian-Georgian conflict, U.S. Ambassador and 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow, 
testified to the “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations and deepened U.S. support for Georgia.  
In his testimony, he stated the Obama administration’s support for Georgia remains 
steadfast and that the U.S. is on the right course with its policy in the region (U.S. Senate, 
2009, p. 1).  Vershbow also maintained that U.S. policy rejects any notion of “spheres of 
influence” in the region and noted the Vice President’s (Biden) comments on his recent 
visit to Georgia that there can be no military option for reintegration of the separatist 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (p. 3).   
Before the signing of the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, the 
Georgian Foreign Minister, Grigol Vashadze, hailed the accord, stating that it represented 
a “stepping stone which will bring Georgia into Euro-Atlantic structures, into 
membership with NATO, and into [the] family of Western and civilized nations” (CRS 
Political, 2009, p. 5).  At the event, and after the Georgian Foreign Minister’s comments, 
the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Matthew Bryza stressed that the charter 
does not provide security guarantees to Georgia.  According to this formulation, the 
United States reaffirmed its high strategic interest in Georgia’s fate, without actually 
committing to its territorial defense in the event of a Russian attack.   
Some observers maintain that this ambiguous policy constitutes U.S. (and NATO) 
acquiescence to a resurgent Russian presence and sphere of influence in the Caucasus.  
Others maintain that the United States should re-evaluate the nature of its commitment of 
support for Georgia and should rethink any question of a U.S. backing for Georgian 
territorial integrity.  The United States is, in fact, already committed to the territorial 
defense of the Baltic Republics, Eastern Europe, and some of the Balkan states by virtue 
of the security guarantee under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty required for all 
NATO members.  In addition to these commitments, the United States has signed similar  
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bilateral security accords with Ukraine through the U.S.-Ukraine Charter signed in 2008 
and the U.S.–Baltic Charter signed in 1998 with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (CRS 
Political, 2009, p. 4).  
3. The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and Sustainment and 
Stability Operations Program (SSOP) 
In addition to earning U.S. support for its membership in NATO through the PfP, 
IPAP, and the AAP, Georgia also receives generous security assistance from the United 
States.  Begun in 2002, the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) was an American-
sponsored 18-month, $64-million plan designed to increase the capabilities of the 
Georgian armed forces.  Originally coordinated by USEUCOM, the program was 
intended to train and equip four 600 man battalions in light infantry airmobile, 
mechanized, and mountain tactics, and medical and logistical methods  (CRS Security, 
2009, pp. 39–40).  The program was tied to Operation Enduring Freedom and U.S. 
counter terrorism efforts and reluctantly accepted by Russia as part of its campaign 
against Chechen terrorists thought to be operating in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge area.  
Although GTEP formally came to a close in April 2004, U.S. military assistance 
continued with the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (Georgia 
SSOP).  This program involved preparing Georgian units for operations with the U.S. 
Forces in Iraq.  Launched in January 2005, the Georgia SSOP was designed to solidify 
the progress made during the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) of 2002–2004 
and assist in the implementation of Western standards for the Georgian armed forces in 
preparation for participation in OEF and eventual NATO membership.  The first part of 
the program (SSOP I) lasted about 18 months and cost approximately $60 million and 
was extended for another year in July 2006 and funded at $30 million ending in 
September 2007 (CRS Security, 2009, pp. 40–41).   
Prior to the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, the United States was providing 
military training to the Georgian 4th Brigade for its eventual deployment to Iraq in the 
Winter 2008.  The cost of this training was budgeted at $35 million (p. 41).  The CRS 
report on Security Issues in Georgia maintains that the GTEP and SSOP provided 
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training to a major portion of Georgia’s armed forces and that one of the successes of the 
program included the encouragement of democratic values in the armed forces.  The 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on regional security also noted that the 
U.S. military training appeared to sometimes strain Russian relations with the United 
States due to Russian concern about the possible use of U.S. trained Georgian troops in 
actions in the breakaway South Ossetia region in 2004.  
In April 2007, the U.S. Congress approved the NATO Freedom Consolidation 
Act, which urged NATO to grant MAP status to Georgia and to allow it to receive 
security assistance funding directly from NATO.  This funding has allowed Georgia to 
participate in NATO-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.  At a press conference in 
March 2009, General James Cartwright, the Deputy Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, announced that the U.S. military would soon start training for Georgian troops that 
is “focused on the defense of Georgia, and on its self and internal defense…[as well as 
determining]… what new types of equipment are necessary for their homeland defense” 
(CRS Political, 2009, p. 32).  At the time, President Saakashvili stated that Georgia is 
building a “modern, top-level, much stronger armed forces, [including] increasing the 
number of personnel, increasing the number of soldiers, increasing the amount of our 
weaponry and, most importantly, raising the level of training” (p. 32).  He also stated that 
the U.S. training would help Georgia to increase its participation in peacekeeping 
operations in Afghanistan.   
4. U.S. Foreign Aid and Democratization in Georgia 
The United States is by far the largest bilateral aid donor to the Republic of 
Georgia.  Between FY1992 and FY2005, Georgia received more than $1 billion in U.S. 
aid (CRS Political, 2009, p. 27).  This amount has enabled Georgia to regularly rank 
among the top recipients of U.S. aid per capita in the world.  This U.S. assistance 
includes Freedom Support Act (FSA) programs, food aid (United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), Peace Corps, and security assistance.  In addition to bilateral aid, 
the United States contributes to multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the World 
Bank (IBRD) that aid the region. 
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In 2004, Congress approved a major new global assistance program, the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).  According to the CRS (2009), countries that 
participate in the MCC are chosen on a competitive basis in accordance with 16 
indicators designed to measure a country’s effectiveness at ruling justly, investing in 
people, and fostering enterprise and entrepreneurship.  The main purpose of the MCC is 
to encourage economic growth in the recipient countries (p. 27).  The program also 
emphasizes good economic policies in recipient countries.  The MCC determined 
Georgia to be eligible for assistance as a democratizing country, although it fell below its 
criteria for anti-corruption efforts.  In 2005, the MCC signed a five-year, $295.3 million 
agreement with Georgia to improve infrastructure, create small business, and promote 
agriculture.  As of July 2008, the MCC had disbursed $51.3 million.  After the 2008 
August Russia-Georgia conflict, the MCC announced plans to spend an additional $100 
million for road-building, water and sanitation projects, and a natural gas storage facility 
(CRS Political, 2009, p. 27). 
In the wake of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Defense and State Departments provided 
Georgia with additional humanitarian assistance.  On September 3, 2008, then-Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice announced a multi-year $1 billion aid plan for Georgia (p. 28).  
This amount would be in addition to the existing aid Georgia receives under the Freedom 
Support Act and Millennium Challenge Corporation funds.  Most of this aid was planned 
for additional humanitarian assistance, reconstruction of infrastructure damaged by the 
Russian invasion, and for “safeguarding Georgia’s continued growth” (p. 28).    
Despite the Russian incursion into Georgia in August 2008, a consensus appears 
to exist among most U.S. policymakers on the desirability of promoting democratization, 
free markets, trade, investment, integration with the West, and use of U.S. power to bring 
security and development to the area.  The 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic 
Partnership calls for the two countries to “pledge cooperation to bolster independent 
media, freedom of expression, and access to objective news and information” and to 
strengthen the rule of law (CRS Political, 2009, pp. 4–5).  The United States has also  
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provided $41.54 million to Georgia from 1992–2007 for law enforcement assistance to 
train judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and police officers (CRS Security, 2009, p. 
38).   
Since the 2007 Rose Revolution, Georgia has firmly committed itself to the 
process of democratization.  President Mikheil Saakashvili won 53% of the votes in the 
presidential elections held in Georgia in January 2008.  Legislative elections were also 
held in May 2008.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
assessed these elections as “broadly meeting its standards, but with some troubling 
irregularities” (CRS Political, 2009, p. 26).  In September of 2008, President Saakashvili 
declared new democratization initiatives meant to strengthen Georgian independence and 
prevent Russia from undermining its statehood.  In addition to the elections in 2008, a 
plebiscite was held that endorsed Georgia’s aim to join NATO.  Some critics maintain 
that increased political instability in Georgia in 2007 and 2008 has raised doubts in the 
United States and NATO about the Saakashvili administration’s commitment to 
democratization.    
5. U.S. Policy and the Separatist Movements in Georgia  
U.S. efforts to promote peace and economic development in Georgia have been 
hampered by ethnic conflict.  The South Caucasus region has been the most unstable part 
of the former Soviet Union in terms of numbers, intensity, and length of ethnic and civil 
conflicts.  The borders of the countries do not coincide with ethnic populations.  Efforts 
by ethnic minorities to secede have been the primary source of conflict in Georgia.  These 
separatist conflicts have been transformed over the years into Russia-Georgia disputes.  
After the 2008 conflict, the majority of the remaining residents of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia were granted Russian citizenship and appeared to want their regions to become 
either independent or a part of Russia (Trenin, 2008, p. 6).   
Up until the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, U.S. policy generally urged Georgia to 
work within existing peace settlement frameworks for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  This 
policy allowed for the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the separatist regions, while 
remaining critical of some Russian actions in the area.  U.S. policy began to shift in 2008 
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due to an increasing number of Russian actions that appeared to threaten the territorial 
integrity of Georgia.  Such actions included increasing government-to-government ties 
between Russia and the regions, such as increased consular services and increasing 
Russian trade and investment.  The change in U.S. and Western policy was reflected in 
the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) discussion in April 2008 in which France, Germany, 
Great Britain, and the United States stated that they “are highly concerned about the latest 
Russian initiative to establish official ties with…Abkhazia and South Ossetia without the 
consent of the Government of Georgia…we call on the Russian Federation to revoke or 
not to implement its decision” (CRS Political, 2009, p. 13).  Throughout the summer, 
tensions continued to build over Russian, Abkhaz, and South Ossetian actions in the 
separatist regions, despite negotiations on the various Georgian peace plans offering 
greater autonomy for the separatist areas.   
According to the report of the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia, these tensions exploded in conflict on the night of August 7-8, 
2008, when a sustained Georgian artillery attack struck the town of Tskhinvali.  This 
initial attack, and a subseqent Georgian advance into South Ossetia, resulted in fighting 
involving Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz military units and armed elements.  The 
report found that this initial Georgian advance was countered by actions of the Russian 
armed forces.  These Russian actions were reported to include air strikes, movement of 
elements of the Russian Black Sea fleet into the Georgian port of Poti, and Russian 
ground forces advancing deep into Georgian territory.  Subsequently, the Russian armed 
forces advanced to a position cutting across Georgia’s main east-west road, but stopped 
short of the capital city, Tbilisi (IIFFMCG, 2009, p. 10). 
On August 15, the Russians agreed to a French-brokered, six-point ceasefire that 
left Russian forces in control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Although Russia withdrew 
most of its military forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 22, substantial 
forces remained in both separatist areas and this action was condemned by the United 
States, NATO, and the EU as a violation of the ceasefire accord.  This condemnation was 
followed by President Dmitry Medvedev’s announcement of official recognition of the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on August 26, 2008 (CRS Political, 2009, 
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p. 17).  The Russian recognition has been widely condemned by the international 
community and the only countries in support of this action have been Nicaragua and 
Venezuela.   
An on-going international conference in Geneva has continued to hold discussions 
on security, repatriation, and status issues relating to the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.  
These discussions have resulted in an agreement in principle on some form of “incident 
prevention and response mechanism” be developed to reduce tensions, investigate violent 
incidents along the conflict borders, and monitor delivery of humanitarian assistance.  
This “mechanism” has yet to be clearly defined or approved for implementation.  Russian 
calls for Georgia to sign a non-use-of-force agreement and an international arms embargo 
of the country have also not been supported by the international community.   
U.S. actions have included the announcement by Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice of the $1 billion multiyear aid package to help Georgia rebuild following the 
conflict.  In addition, visits by then Vice President Dick Cheney in September 2008, Vice 
President Joe Biden in July 2009, and other high-ranking Members of Congress, have 
promised continued support and assistance from the United States.  Legislation was also 
passed by Congress expressing U.S. support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.  At their first meeting in April 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev issued a 
joint statement where the two sides agreed to “disagree about the causes and sequence of 
the military actions” [of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict] and promised 
“effective cooperation in the Geneva discussions [on security, repatriation, and status] to 
bring stability to the region” (CRS Political, 2009, p. 1). 
6. U.S. Economic and Energy Policy in Georgia   
In the realm of economic and energy policy, the Bush Administration pushed for 
privatization and the creation of free markets to open markets for U.S. goods and services 
and provides sources of energy and minerals.  Bilateral trade and investment agreements 
providing for normal trade relations and investment guarantees have been signed between 
the United States and Georgia.  In June 2000, Georgia was admitted to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) with U.S. support (CRS Political, 2009, p. 32).  
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The 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership calls for the two 
countries to pursue an Enhanced Bilateral Investment Treaty, to expand Georgian access 
to the General System of Preferences, and explore the possibility of a Free-Trade 
Agreement (CRS Political, 2009).  Energy security goals include “increasing Georgia’s 
energy production, enhancing energy efficiency, and increasing the physical security of 
energy transit through Georgia to European markets” (p. 4). 
Although Georgia has no significant energy reserves, it has proven to be a 
valuable alternative transportation corridor around Russia’s current near-monopoly of 
energy supplies in the region.  Although the U.S. Energy Department estimates 7–13 
billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 30–48 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas 
reserves in neighboring Azerbaijan, critics argue that this is a tiny percent of world 
exports (CRS Political, 2009).  The Bush Administration argued that these energy exports 
would nevertheless reduce European energy dependence on Russia, and thereby, promote 
Western energy security.  The United States has accordingly encouraged the construction 
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and South Caucasus natural gas pipelines 
(SCP), which were completed in 2006 and 2007, respectively, and which offer a sizeable 
energy corridor through Georgia (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) that effectively 
circumvents the Russian near monopoly of pipelines for Central Asian energy resources.  
The BTC pipeline has a capacity of about 1 million barrels per day (p. 33). 
The completion of the BTC and SCP pipelines has increased European awareness 
of the strategic importance of the Southern Caucasus region.  The United States has 
signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation for construction of other 
pipelines that provide EU members with sources of supply for Caspian Sea oil that 
bypass Russia.  The U.S. Trade Development Administration has also supported 
feasibility studies to build trans-Caspian pipelines that can link to the BTC and SCP 
pipelines already in place and boost energy supplies outside of direct Russian control 
(CRS Political, 2009, pp. 33–34).  According to Dov Lynch at the Institute for Security 
Studies, although the EU does not share an immediate external border with Georgia 
(although Turkey and NATO do), it matters because of its importance as a transit route  
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for energy goods from the Caspian Sea region and as part of the overall EU concept of 
self-defense based on security interdependence with regions beyond its borders (Lynch, 
2006, pp. 8–9). 
B. CONCLUSION: U.S. ENGAGEMENT POLICY AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
GEORGIA  
The proponents of containment maintain that a high level of U.S. engagement in 
Georgia and membership in NATO would strengthen its independence and sovereignty 
(Cornell, 2007; Cohen, 2009).  This school of thought holds that U.S. aid is required to 
bolster Georgia’s security and independence, and to prevent the spread of terrorism in the 
area.  The most important aspects of this activist engagement policy are support for 
Georgian NATO membership, robust military-security support arrangements, and 
democratic and market economic reform.  According to Cornell, American interests in 
the region can be arranged into three important categories, “from the “softer” to “harder,” 
these include sovereignty and democracy, energy and trade, and security” (p. 5).   
Realists maintain that the spread of democracy, increasing globalization, and 
interdependence have not altered the conduct of international relations based on the 
balance of power and power politics.  Anthony Cordesman (2008) at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies maintains that Russia’s recent invasion of Georgia is, 
“a reminder that the world is not shaped by democratic values, international law, good 
intentions, globalism, rational bargains, or the search for dialogue” (p. 1).  Although these 
and other factors such as “hard power” and “soft power” do play an important role in 
international politics, he maintains that classic power politics are just as real as ever.  
Trenin (2008) warns that a more democratic (softer) Russia might not necessarily mean a 
more pliable Russia, but a more demanding partner and effective competitor (p. 6).  In his 
view, the Russian leadership and military could view high levels of U.S. engagement in 
Georgia and NATO enlargement from a realist calculus as evidence of “Washington’s 
pawns, ready to become platforms for the Pentagon” (p. 5).  
Despite its limitations, the current U.S. policy of deliberate ambiguity does give 
the United States (and NATO) a range of options if Georgia’s political instability and/or 
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separatist wars spill over into a major regional conflict with Russia.  Dmitri Simes (2007) 
at the Nixon Center contends that American interests do not warrant activities that risk 
provoking a potential nuclear contest with a resurgent Russia.  Such a policy of deliberate 
ambiguity allows the United States to remain committed to Georgian independence and 
territorial integrity through its continued integration with NATO (as a permanent 
candidate for membership), EU, and U.S. bilateral agreements.  On the other hand, the 
lack of an absolute U.S. or NATO security guarantee for Georgia avoids the risk of a 
direct confrontation with Moscow.  Such a policy might also persuade Tbilisi to conduct 
a more nuanced policy towards its separatist areas and encourage conflict resolution with 
Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
The current policy of deliberate ambiguity might also create uncertainty for 
Russia about U.S. and NATO intentions and could have a restraining influence on 
Moscow with regard to Georgia.  Critics of this policy, such as Cornell (2007) or Cohen 
(2009) would argue that it constitutes appeasement and only encourages Russian control 
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  In this view, an ambiguous policy might also promote 
efforts by Russia to destabilize the Saakashvili regime either directly through military 
incursion or by indirect means designed to bring about Saakashvili’s ouster from office.   
Finally, it is possible that the current U.S. policy of not extending a security 
guarantee to Georgia is not one of deliberate choice or purposeful ambiguity. This policy 
could instead be a reflection of the realist-idealist contradiction at work in the day-to-day 
conduct of U.S. foreign policy.  This contradiction between American principles and U.S. 
security interests can often lead to inconsistency in policy and ambiguity in practice as 
currently manifested in U.S. engagement policy toward the Republic of Georgia. 
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IV. RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND THE GEORGIAN GORDIAN 
KNOT 
A. RUSSIA, NATO, AND GEORGIA  
I don't think Russia will follow the United States’ way.  I don't think 
Russia will follow the French way.  I'm sure Russia will find its own way.  
Anatoly Chubais, Russian economist and 
politician, an architect of the “loans-for-
shares” privatization program. (PBS, 2000) 
In the film, Fog of War (2002), former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara maintained that one critical factor in the successful resolution of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis was empathy.  Based on his years of experience as a key decision-maker in 
the Cold War, McNamara identified eleven lessons of life that all leaders should seek to 
be aware of in times of crisis. McNamara’s first lesson was, “to empathize with your 
enemy.”  In the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy’s decision to empathize with 
his enemy and respond to the first (soft) telegram from Khrushchev, rather than the 
second (hard-line) message proved decisive in breaking the impasse and avoiding a 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union.  McNamara warned that it is always necessary to try 
to put ourselves in the skin of adversaries so as to better understand the thought behind 
their decisions (Fog of War, 2002).  Although widely condemned and hardly analogous 
to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Russia’s actions in the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict may be 
better understood by analysis of its point-of-view, as well as those of Georgia, the U.S., 
and NATO. 
1. Russia and NATO Enlargement: Putin in Munich  
Idealists consider NATO enlargement into the areas of the former Warsaw Pact 
and Soviet Union as a triumph of democratic values, a natural expression of national self-
determination, and a rejection of past Russian/Soviet domination.  On the other hand, 
Realists consider NATO enlargement as a reflection of the current balance of power, 
Russia’s relative decline vis-à-vis the United States and the necessity of NATO filling a 
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power vacuum left by the Soviet collapse.  From the Russian point of view, NATO’s 
eastward expansion is considered a breach of a (verbal) promise.  Then Russian 
President, Vladimir Putin, in a 2007 speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 
expressed this Russian point of view on NATO enlargement: 
I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with 
the modernization of the Alliance or with ensuring security in Europe.  On 
the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of 
mutual trust.  And we have a right to ask: against whom is this expansion 
intended?  …I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary 
Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990.  He said at the time that: “the 
fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German 
territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.”  Where are 
these guarantees [now]? (Putin in Munich, 2007, p. 7) 
At the same conference, Mr. Putin was asked whether the situation was a case of 
NATO expansion or an expression of self-determination by democratic states wanting 
NATO membership.  It was also asserted at the conference that NATO enlargement 
(eastward) has made Russia’s borders more reliable and more secure.  President Putin 
responded to this assertion by stating:    
Regarding our perception of NATO’s eastern expansion. I already 
mentioned the guarantees that were made that are not being observed 
today.  …But alright, forget it.  Forget these guarantees.  With respect to 
democracy and NATO expansion…NATO is not a universal organization, 
as opposed to the UN.  It is first and foremost a military and political 
alliance.  Well, ensuring one’s own security is the right of any sovereign 
state.  We are not arguing against this.  Of course we are not objecting to 
this.  But why is it necessary to put military infrastructure on our borders 
during this expansion? Can someone answer this question?  Unless the 
expansion of military infrastructure is connected with fighting against 
today’s global threats?  Let’s put it this way, what is the most important of 
these threats for us today…the most important [threat] for Russia, for the 
USA, and for Europe…it is terrorism and the fight against it. (p. 14)  
Despite the impression by President Putin and Russian elites about an agreement 
on NATO enlargement, Mark Kramer at the Harvard University Cold War Studies 
Project maintains that there was actually no formal accord concluded between the former 
Soviet Union and NATO on eastward expansion (Kramer, 2009, p. 54).  Kramer 
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maintains that declassified materials confirm that no pledge or commitment was ever 
made to Gorbachev in 1990 regarding alliance expansion into any other East European 
countries and that none of the other discussions on the enlargement of NATO went 
beyond the question of Germany (pp. 40–41).  In July 1990, former German Chancellor 
Kohl and Russian President Gorbachev did agree to an American sponsored nine-point 
plan that recognized a reunified Germany as a member in the NATO integrated command 
structure and that German troops could be stationed on the territory of the former GDR 
(p. 54).   
Despite this, controversy surrounding the issue of a pledge by the West to not 
expand NATO into Eastern Europe continues.  In September 2008, Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov insisted that in 1990 the United States, “made a commitment not 
to expand NATO” and has “repeatedly broken this commitment” in years since (Kramer, 
2009, p. 40).  Complicating the situation further, some Western officials, such as Jack F. 
Matlock, the former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1990, have endorsed this 
view and insist that Gorbachev did receive a “clear commitment that if Germany united, 
and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward” (U.S. Congress, 
1996, p. 31).  These assertions have been sharply challenged by other U.S. policymakers 
directly involved in the German reunification process in 1990. 
Although it is probable that no formal written or verbal agreement on NATO 
expansion was actually made by any Western leader with Gorbachev in 1990, it could be 
more important that Russian elites believe that an informal promise was made.  Such 
perceptions can become reality and could have the effect of feeding a Russian sense of 
betrayal by the West over the issue of NATO enlargement.  Although the possibility of 
another “stab in the back” conspiracy theory developing in Russia seems remote, such 
legends have had potent domestic political effects on the conduct of foreign policy in the 
past in both Europe (Versailles) and the United States (Vietnam).  
One possible approach for resolving these disputes between NATO and Russia is 
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).  The NRC was established in 2002 to serve as a 
mechanism for improving relations between NATO and Russia.  It seeks to maintain a 
dialogue on security issues, identify emerging problems, and build cooperation in the 
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conduct of joint operations (NATO NRC, 2009).  However, following Russia’s military 
action in Georgia in early August 2008, the Alliance suspended formal meetings of the 
NRC and cooperation in some areas, while it considered the implications of Russia’s 
actions for the NATO-Russia relationship.  The Secretary General of NATO declared that 
Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia [as independent nations] violated 
numerous UN Security Council resolutions, including resolutions endorsed by Russia 
(NATO NRC, 2009).  Some cooperation has continued in key areas of common interest, 
such as counter-narcotics and the fight against terrorism.  A decision to resume formal 
meetings and practical cooperation was taken in March 2009, but has reported no 
progress on improving relations between NATO and Russia since the 2008 Russia-
Georgia conflict (NATO NRC, 2009).   
2. Russia’s Transition to a “Normal Country”   
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s transition to a “normal country” 
(capitalist democracy) has been a continuing source of debate over its direction and in the 
conduct of its foreign policy.  Some Russian area specialists emphasize Russia’s unique 
historical experience as being a key to understanding contemporary Russian foreign 
policy.  Dr. Stephen Kotkin (2007), a professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies at 
Princeton University, maintains that Russia is a “normal country” because, like most 
countries of the world, it has a “ramshackle authoritarian system with some democratic 
trappings” (p. 1).  However, he maintains that, Russia is not in transition to or from 
anything.  “Russia is what it is” (p. 1).  He maintains that part of the problem of 
understanding the Russia reality today is due to U.S. reporting that is poorly sourced and 
overly obsessed with Kremlin politics and its leadership. 
Based on his discussions with Russian officials, Kotkin asserts that the notion that 
Russia is a normal country in transition to either dictatorship or democracy is overly 
simplistic.  He maintains that the popular idea in the U.S. that the Russian political 
system has been taken over by a KGB-dominated Putin group that controls the country is 
incorrect.  In actuality, he believes that there is considerable internal chaos and division 
inside the ruling team.  The fact that Putin comes from the KGB and has brought in many 
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of his colleagues from the KGB is not reflective of internal unity or a move in the 
direction of a security regime, but evidence of the highly personalistic nature of the 
Russian political system.  In Kotkin’s view, “Putin’s regime falls far short of being a 
dictatorship and should be viewed on its own Russian terms, not in the context of a 
transition to dictatorship or democracy” (p. 3).  
A second key factor in understanding contemporary Russia on its own terms, 
according to Kotkin, is its dynamic, stable society.  Russia has a growing state and 
corporate middle class that has a huge stake in maintaining stability.  This middle class is 
smart in that it is largely apolitical and is not ready to sacrifice its hard-earned position to 
push for rule of law and democracy.  Rather, it is interested in preserving its wealth and 
privileges.  Accordingly, Russian society is appreciative of order, but is not consolidating 
around any type of Putin dictatorship.  In any event, with the collapse of ideology, it 
would be difficult for the Russian state to impose any type of military control over 
society or its now globalized market economy in Kotkin’s view.  He maintains that, 
“Russian society is not transitioning to dictatorship or democracy, but is evolving in 
accordance with its own Russian sensibilities and based on its own experience” (p. 3).   
A third key factor in understanding Russia and the conduct of its foreign policy is 
related to its emergence as a revived, assertive, and sometimes resentful regional power 
according to Kotkin (2007).  He asserts that Russia’s newly assertive foreign policy is not 
indicative of a return to Cold War-style confrontation.  Accordingly, Russia’s emergence 
as a strategic power with interests of its own that may conflict at times with Western 
interests is not unusual (p. 3).  The principal potential danger in Trenin’s (2008) view is 
that there is an absence of rules for the emerging U.S.-Russian relationship and “Now, 
U.S. global hegemony is directly challenged by Russia’s regional great power ambitions” 
(p. 2).  Like other emerging regional powers, such as China or India, Russian power 
continues to be felt.  However, a resurgent Russia that can protect its interests and project 
real power does create challenges for NATO enlargement, particularly in the Republic of 
Georgia and Ukraine. 
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3. Resurgent Russia and Georgia: Soft Power vs. Hard Power 
Realists maintain that the spread of democracy, increasing globalization, and 
interdependence (soft power) have not altered the conduct of international relations based 
on the balance of power and power politics (hard power).  According to Cordesman 
(2008) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the crucial factor in this 
century will be “real power,” not “soft power” or “smart power,” just as it has been 
decisive in every other century in human history (p. 1).  In this context, Russia’s invasion 
of Georgia in August 2008 illustrates some of the limitations of evaluating Russia by 
current, Western standards.  In Cordesman’s view, although Russia may not be a peer 
power with the United States, it is becoming an increasingly strong regional power that 
has proven it can and will act on its perception of its own interests.  Like Kotkin (2007) 
and Trenin (2008), Cordesman maintains that these interests are based on goals and 
values that differ from those of the United States.  “There is no reason for them [Russia] 
to be enemies, and they may often be partners, but they will also be competitors and act 
with a degree of ruthlessness that we will sometimes be able to contain and other times 
have to accept” (p. 1). 
Historically, Western measures of “soft power” and “hard power” have been 
particularly suspect when attempting to evaluate Russian/Soviet capabilities and 
intentions.  Even at the height of Soviet power and influence abroad, its domestic 
economy was considered poorly developed and it was dependent on the United States for 
grain imports.  Despite its dysfunctional economy and weak political institutions, by 
virtue of its geostrategic location, vast natural resource potential, and large, highly 
educated population the Soviet Union was able to project real power.  This seemingly 
contradictory mixture of poorly developed economic and political institutions combined 
with “hard power” projection capability predated the Soviet Union and resulted in 
military defeats of more sophisticated Western powers during its previous wars.  
The 2008 invasion of Georgia raises the issue of Russia’s place in the world as a 
regional power given its historic legacy.  The Russian armed forces are in poor condition; 
its territory has been reduced; it possesses no empire or satellites; it barely has a sphere of 
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influence; it lacks meaningful alliances; its economy is weak; and its political system has 
no appeal for developing countries.  Despite these and other weaknesses, Russia’s ability 
to overcome such shortcomings (albeit at great cost) may indicate that traditional Western 
measures of effectiveness do not quite capture the current Russian reality.  Although 
these and other factors, such as “hard power” and “soft power” do play an important role 
in international politics, Cordesman (2008) maintains that classic power politics are just 
as real as ever.  In his view, “as long as countries still possess weapons, more powerful 
states will try to bend or break the rules if it is in their interest to do so and no opposing 
power bloc can present a convincing threat to them” (p. 1).   
4. Sources of Russian Power in its “Back Yard”   
Over and underestimating Russian power is a well-established cottage industry in 
the West and is closely related to current, often technocratic assessments of Russia’s 
dismal economic circumstances, weak political institutions, and poorly developed 
military forces.  With its currency crashing, foreign capital outflow, and decrease in 
energy revenues, the Western perception may be that Russia is on the verge of collapse. 
As the result of this anomaly, Western countries sometimes believe that Russia’s 
capability to project power abroad has been correspondingly reduced.  STRATFOR 
analysts Laura Goodrich and Peter Zeihan (2009) at the Global Intelligence Group 
maintain that the art of assessing Russia is different from “a normal country” in that, 
“Russia rarely follows anyone else’s rulebook” (p. 1).   
Goodrich and Zeihan (2009) maintain that although Moscow’s centralized system 
is highly inefficient, because of Russia’s huge size and poor transportation options, it is 
the best solution under the circumstances.  They question whether a Western finance-
driven development model is even feasible for Russia.  What this means for 
understanding Russian power is that many of the traditional Western measures of 
(economic) success, (which in the West often underlies calculation of political and 
military strength) may be irrelevant for Russia (p. 4).  Accordingly, the reality of Russian 
power looks, smells, and tastes differently than a normal (Western) country and may 
cause the West to sometimes underestimate or misunderstand Russia.      
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In their article, Goodrich and Zeihan (2009) suggest that there are six pillars of 
Russian power that are different for most countries but are more than ever before relevant 
for Russia today.  Probably, the first and most significant pillar of Russian power, is 
geography.  Russia has a geographic advantage over the U.S. in its own “backyard.”  
“Russia can project all manner of influence and intimidation there on the cheap, while 
even symbolic encounters are quite costly for the U.S.” (p. 5).  Outside its zone of 
geopolitical advantage, in Latin America, Africa, or Southeast Asia, Moscow has 
correspondingly little influence.   
The second pillar of Russian power is the authoritarian nature of the Russian 
government, which serves as a source of stability and domestic support and control (p. 5).  
The authoritarian nature of Russian government is supported by a third pillar, which is a 
social system that the government can count on to support the state and keep the country 
going with minimal protest over poor conditions (pp. 5–6).  This pillar is supported by a 
growing middle class that is largely apolitical, appreciative of order, and interested in 
preserving its wealth and privileges.  The fourth pillar is Russia’s wealth of natural 
resources in food, precious metals, timber, natural gas, and oil.  Although these 
commodities may make the Russian economy subject to market swings, they provide 
Russia with a valuable source of foreign capital and can be used for political purposes for 
short-term political gains (p. 6).   
The fifth pillar of Russian power is the military, which is in the process of a broad 
modernization and restructuring effort following its poor performance in its recent 
conflict in the Republic of Georgia.  According to Goodrich and Ziehan (2009), Russia’s 
low-level war fighting capability is compensated for by close proximity to its “near 
abroad” and relatively minimal power projection requirements.  “Russia can project 
power into its vital backyard areas relatively cheaply and win even when its military 
performs poorly” (p. 6).  In fact, Russia’s rapid victory over Georgia in August 2008 
surprised Western observers because the conflict contrasted sharply with Moscow’s 
protracted conflict in Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 and 1999 to 2000.  However, 
according to Political Scientist Roger McDermott (2008), the Russia-Georgia conflict did 
expose fundamental weaknesses in Russia’s armed forces (p. 1).  McDermott cites two 
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critical factors that led to decisive results in the short 2008 conflict.  The first key factor 
in the speed of the Russian military victory was the opening of a second front in 
Abkhazia using mechanized infantry.  The second critical factor was the rapid collapse of 
the Georgian armed forces due to poor management and limited combat capabilities (p. 
2).  However, despite its critical shortcomings, the Russian armed forces succeeded in 
executing a short, decisive victory over Georgia in August 2008.    
Russia’s sixth pillar of strength is its intelligence capability.  According to 
Goodrich and Ziehan (2009), Russia has one of the most sophisticated and powerful 
intelligence services in the world (pp. 6–7).  Since the Russian Foreign Intelligence 
Service (SVR) relies heavily on human resources, it is relatively inexpensive to run, and 
obtains a high rate of return because of its long experience in running relatively low-tech 
HUMan INTelligence (HUMINT) operations.  This intelligence apparatus is particularly 
effective in conducting operations in areas along the Russian periphery, and in its “near 
abroad,” on the cheap.   
Accordingly, even with weak political institutions and its economy in a free-fall, 
the Russian state is able to maintain domestic stability and project power in its backyard 
at relatively low cost.  Although Western metrics may not accurately capture the reality 
of Russian power, McDermott (2008) maintains that the war did expose serious 
shortcomings in the performance of the Russian military.  “It is unusual, to say the least, 
that a successful war should come to be regarded as a catalyst for military reform” (p. 
13).  He asserts that 2008 conflict has led to a concerted effort at military reform to close 
the gap between image and reality in Russia’s armed forces.  However, the 2008 Russian-
Georgian conflict demonstrates that Russia is capable and willing to use “hard power” 
options when it believes its security is threatened, particularly if it lacks many “soft 
power” policy options. 
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Figure 4.   Russian Bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (From: Heritage 
Foundation, 2009) 
5. “Resurgent Russia’s Campaign to Coerce Georgia” 
British scholar Roy Allison (2008) maintains that there are two schools of thought 
regarding the motivations and objectives of Russia’s campaign in Georgia.  The first 
school holds that the Russian operation was essentially a retaliatory, although 
exceptionally large-scale, response to a Georgian attack on South Ossetia.  The second 
school argues that Russia’s core justification for the invasion, the protection of Russian 
citizens, served as a cover for its main purpose of using raw military force to enforce 
compliance by neighboring states and to demonstrate Russian regional superpower status 
(pp. 1145–46). 
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In reviewing the situation leading up to the 2008 crisis, Georgians have claimed 
that the Russians helped and supplied the South Ossetians in the initial 1991–92 conflict 
that followed its declaration of independence from Georgia in 1990.  The ceasefire, 
mediated by Russia in June 1992 (the Sochi Agreement), created joint Russian-Ossetian-
Georgian patrols as part of a peacekeeping operation (p. 1146).  In reality, however, this 
ceasefire agreement froze the conflict in place and resulted in a de facto separation of 
South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia. 
During Putin’s tenure as president, Russia continued to increase its security 
presence in the separatist areas.  Tensions increased in 2004 over the election of Georgian 
President Saakashvili on a platform of restoring his country’s lost territories.  These 
strains occurred at the same time that Georgian-Russian tensions were increasing over 
Georgia’s growing security relationship with the United States and NATO.  Leading up 
to the 2008 conflict, Allison asserts that it is likely that both Georgia and Russia had 
contingency plans for military operations in South Ossetia (p. 1149).  Although it is 
difficult to determine Russian strategic intentions based on its force disposition, Allison 
argues that the nature of its deployments constitutes “strong evidence” that the Russian 
invasion was planned, rather than spontaneous (p. 1149). 
According to Allison (2008), Russia’s justifications for the 2008 invasion of 
Georgia have included several arguments.  At first, Russia maintained that its actions 
were motivated by concern for force protection and self-defense.  This reason has been 
used successfully by the U.S. in the past to justify protection of its peacekeepers to 
provide for emergency assistance or evacuation, but not to support a large-scale 
(offensive) military operation.  Other justifications used by Russia included Article 51 of 
the UN Charter authorizing the right to self-defense, defense of Russian citizens in South 
Ossetia, and the intent to prevent humanitarian disaster and/or ethnic cleansing (pp. 
1151–55).  The international community, because of Russia’s poor record concerning the 
protection of any civilians during the conflict, has skeptically received these claims 
justifying Russia’s disproportionate response to Georgia’s initial actions. 
Allison (2008) maintains that the real motivation behind the Russian invasion into 
Georgia is a complex mixture of local, regional, and geopolitical concerns.  “Although 
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probably not the expression of a master plan,” he asserts that Russia has created “new 
facts on the ground” that have diminished decisively the attractiveness for NATO of the 
option to offer Georgia or Ukraine membership in the Alliance (pp. 1161–62).  The 
Russian intervention has also created divisions within NATO between France, Germany, 
Italy and the United States over American policy in support of Georgia and the question 
of NATO enlargement. According to a NATO Defense College Research Paper, the 
conflict has isolated Georgia and seriously undermined its power and prestige in the eyes 
of European public opinion (Razoux, 2009, p. 2).  This isolation has resulted in Ukraine 
reducing its ties with Tbilisi and refusal by Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko, to 
take his country out of the CIS (p. 2).  According to Trenin (2008), only 20 percent of 
Ukrainians actually support NATO membership and 44 percent have sided with Russia in 
its war with Georgia (p. 2).  Even within NATO, many member states regarded Ukraine 
as not ready for accession and pointed to the fact that the Ukrainian public was opposed 
to NATO entry (Kamp, 2007, p. 4).    
Allison (2008) argues that the Russian use of force in Georgia in 2008 is evidence 
of its strategic determination to counter the NATO and U.S. presence in neighboring 
states.  “Moscow’s defiant and not very persuasive justification for engaging in major 
combat operations suggests that its main purpose is strategic competition with the West 
rather than local conditions in Georgia or South Ossetia” (p. 1170).  He also points out 
that Russia’s actions in Georgia may also be a reflection of domestic political 
considerations.  However, Allison warns that overreaction by the West to Russia’s new 
assertiveness could reinforce Moscow’s insistence on being acknowledged as a regional 
super power in its own right.         
B. CONCLUSION:  RUSSIA’S ZERO-SUM PROBLEM 
Yet another perspective on Russian interests and the 2008 Russian-Georgian 
conflict that is commonly used in the literature of international relations is related to the 
concept that power is zero-sum.  The idea that power is zero-sum describes a competitive 
situation where one side’s gain, is the other side’s loss (Baldwin, 1993, pp. 18–19).  In 
this context, the Russian invasion of Georgia is often portrayed in the West as an example 
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of zero-sum thinking by Russia that fails to appreciate the fundamental changes that have 
taken place in an increasingly globalized world. The 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict is 
viewed as a crude, outmoded attempt by Russia to maintain its security at Georgia’s 
expense and prevent it from joining the (Western) community of nations as embodied in 
NATO and the EU.  In this context, Georgia’s security win (NATO membership) is 
considered by Russia as a net security loss. 
A positive-sum strategy is a win-win situation where everyone benefits.  It can 
also be considered a conflict resolution strategy that aims to accommodate all the 
disputants (Baldwin, 1993, pp. 18–19).  According to this view, national and international 
security is tied to an increasingly beneficial web of growing interdependence (idealism) 
that makes the old system of geopolitical alliances and security guarantees obsolete 
(realism).  The positive-sum view regards Georgia’s membership in NATO and the EU as 
a modernizing project enhancing security and create economic growth for the benefit of 
all nations, Russia included.  NATO enlargement to include Georgia (and Ukraine) would 
expand economic interdependence and enhance the security of Georgia, NATO, and 
Russia.  In this context, NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine is a win-win policy 
and an effective mechanism for conflict resolution for all the disputants. 
Historian Craig Nation (2007), at the U.S. Army War College, maintains that “A 
zero-sum “Great Game” for leverage in so fragile an area is not in the best interests of 
either major external actors or the region’s peoples” (p. vii).  He suggests that policy 
needs to go beyond the current assertive, zero-sum framework and focus on a mutual 
security model more appropriate for the Russian-American relationship (pp. 32–33).  
However, Nation asserts that although the United States has “no vital” interest at stake on 
the Russian periphery, U.S. engagement in the Caucasus does not threaten Russian 
interests (p. 32).  Editor Thomas de Waal (2009) at the Institute for War and Peace refers 
the current situation in the Caucasus as resembling “a geopolitical suicide pact” rooted in 
regional conflicts that gives birth to polarized, zero-sum thinking (p. 1).  He believes a 
broader engagement by a large international organization, such as the European Union, is 
the best hope for transformation and overcoming internal divisions in the region.    
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In reconciling these alternate views about zero-sum thinking, security and 
interdependence using McNamara’s first principle (empathy), one might consider the 
proposition that national security policies tend to be positive-sum for distant threats, but 
very zero-sum in close proximity to insecure national borders despite globalization and 
the end of the Cold War.  The positive-sum school views the 2008 Russian invasion of 
Georgia as an aggressive (zero-sum) act of a declining power, while the zero-sum school 
views it as a predictable, defensive act by an insecure regional power in transition (with 
few positive-sum options).   
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V. CONCLUSION: U.S. ENGAGEMENT POLICY, 
GEOPOLITICS, AND THE GEORGIAN KNOT 
A. DELIBERATE AMBIGUITY OR REALIST–IDEALIST 
CONTRADICTION  
Under the formulation of the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership 
signed in January 2009, the United States reaffirmed its high strategic interest in 
Georgia’s fate without actually committing to its territorial defense in the event of a 
Russian invasion.  The agreement also promised cooperation between the two countries 
“to increase Georgian capabilities and …strengthen Georgia’s candidacy for NATO 
membership,” without actually offering it a security guarantee at the present time (CRS 
Political, 2009, p. 4).  Such a policy of possibly offering a security guarantee at a time to 
be determined in the future could be construed as duplicitous in that it affirms U.S. 
commitments to an area (and people) publicly deemed vital to U.S. interests, but reserves 
the unstated option of no security guarantee in the event of an invasion by Russia.  For 
the purposes of this thesis, this policy has been defined as one of deliberate ambiguity.   
Such a policy of deliberate ambiguity could also be construed by Russia as 
acquiescence to its sphere of influence in the Caucasus, and perhaps, other parts of the 
former Soviet Union, and could encourage a more assertive Russian policy abroad.  It 
might also undermine Georgian confidence, already shaken in August 2008, in U.S. 
commitments to the region and reinforce the notion that Georgia’s independence and 
security could be sacrificed on the geopolitical altar of larger “Great Power” U.S.-
Russian geostrategic interests.  Such a policy might also signal to the newer members of 
the NATO Alliance in the Baltic region, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe, a lack of U.S. 
commitment to oppose Moscow’s more forceful policy in Russia’s “near abroad.”  
On the other hand, continued U.S. commitment to Georgia under the U.S.–
Georgia Strategic Partnership and in NATO without a security guarantee could also be 
part of a U.S. policy of deliberate strategic ambiguity that maximizes deterrence, while at 
the same time preserves flexibility required for a large, unwieldy alliance, such as NATO 
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under the circumstances.  Such a policy does reduce the risk of a direct military 
confrontation between NATO and Russia over Georgia, and can enhance deterrence 
through uncertainty and the diplomatic fog of potential war.  
Unfortunately, the third option of offering Georgia membership in NATO with 
the Article 5 security guarantee would leave the Alliance with few strategic options if 
Russia did in fact decide to act unilaterally and invade.  As this study has sought to 
demonstrate, this event, though unlikely, could occur as the result of deliberate Russian 
policy or through miscalculation, or as in August 2008, as the result of events tied to 
Georgia’s ethno-nationalist separatist movements.   
Although a security guarantee and NATO membership for Georgia would offer 
some deterrent value against Russian invasion, in conventional military terms, it might be 
perceived as a weak deterrent.  First, it might be perceived as weak if some major allies 
such as France, Germany, and Italy expressed reservations about supporting a military 
option to defend Georgia. Second, Georgia’s geographic isolation from the Alliance and 
direct proximity to Russia would make its military defense difficult for NATO.  Third, 
NATO is currently engaged in fighting a war in Afghanistan (and the United States is 
engaged in both Afghanistan and Iraq) and this might make the deterrence value of the 
NATO mutual defense guarantee less credible.  Fourth, some NATO countries in 
Afghanistan are able to meet their current defense commitments under Article 5 only 
under an inequitable, divisive system of national “caveats”  to maintain domestic political 
support for the war.  Given the current divisions within the NATO alliance on extending 
membership to Georgia (and Ukraine), it is hard to imagine unity on the question of 
defending Georgia’s territorial integrity in the event of a Russian invasion.  The absence 
of unity on this question may continue to dissuade some Allies from offering Georgia 
membership in the Alliance.  In this case, Georgia may remain outside of NATO 
indefinitely.  
Finally, and despite the poor performance of Russia’s military during the August 
2008 conflict, it demonstrated a capability to cut across Georgia’s main east-west road, 
reach the port of Poti, and move into positions just short of the capital city, Tbilisi, in a 
matter of days (McDermott, 2008).  Russia does not necessarily need a competent 
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military to threaten Georgia if it feels its interests there are threatened.  Despite its faults, 
the current U.S. policy of deliberate strategic ambiguity does give the United States and 
NATO greater flexibility and might provide a more effective deterrent to a Russian attack 
under the circumstances.  The worst case scenario, that Russia would attack Georgia even 
with a NATO Security Guarantee when the Alliance is weakened by internal dissension, 
divided by a system of national caveats, and overextended in a long-term counter-
insurgency campaign in Afghanistan, although unlikely, is not impossible. 
In conclusion, it is possible that the current U.S. policy of not extending a security 
guarantee to Georgia is not one of deliberate choice or purposeful ambiguity. This policy 
could instead be a reflection of the realist-idealist contradiction at work in the day-to-day 
conduct of U.S. foreign policy.  This contradiction between the promotion of American 
ideals and the protection of U.S. security interests creates a tension in the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy that is often hard to reconcile with the messy reality of world politics.  
This contradiction between American principles and U.S. security interests can often lead 
to inconsistency in policy and ambiguity in practice as currently manifested in the U.S. 
engagement strategy towards the Republic of Georgia.   
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
NATO was originally created primarily as a military alliance designed to contain 
the Soviet expansion into Western Europe.  Its secondary role was to create an 
institutional framework in which the national rivalries within Europe, which had resulted 
in centuries of wars, could be resolved.  To date, NATO enlargement has proven to be an 
effective mechanism for resolving disputes between nations and many of the disputes in 
Central and Eastern Europe have been mitigated through the NATO membership process.  
This mechanism for resolving disputes between nations might work even more 
effectively with greater inclusion, rather than exclusion of all the parties concerned.   
One such mechanism for conflict resolution is the currently moribund NATO-
Russia Council (NRC), which suspended formal meetings after the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
Conflict.  More recently in September 2009, the NATO Secretary General, Anders 
Rasmussen gave his first major public speech on “NATO and Russia: A New 
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Beginning.”  In the speech, Mr. Rasmussen outlined his views on a strategic partnership 
with Russia and outlined proposals for an improved relationship and a rejuvenated 
NATO-Russia Council.  In his address, he argued that, “Quite simply, NATO-Russia 
cooperation is not a matter of choice—it is a matter of necessity” (NATO Newsroom, 
2009, p. 1).   
NATO should consider the possibility of admitting countries on its distant 
periphery that border Russia as “associate members.” An associate status might entitle 
members to all the benefits of NATO membership to include the right to join an alliance 
of its choice and integration into the NATO military structure without a territorial 
security guarantee.  This NATO policy would then be more in line with the current U.S. 
policy of deliberate ambiguity that supports Georgia’s continued integration in NATO 
security structures, while at the same time, allowing for some flexibility in the event of a 
crisis.  Under such a policy, NATO cooperation and support for Georgian independence 
and sovereignty as a democratic nation would be undiminished, while at the same time, 
recognizing that some Russian defensive concerns along its immediate border are 
warranted.   
NATO “associate status” would be for countries on NATO’s far periphery that are 
important, but are difficult for the Alliance to defend credibly.  NATO’s credibility has 
already been strained by the extension of its security guarantee to twelve new post-Cold 
War members, its troubled performance in ISAF, and a divisive policy of national caveats 
for combat in Afghanistan.  At the same time, a policy of strategic ambiguity would still 
give NATO a credible deterrent in the event of a crisis under a variety of circumstances. 
The United States and NATO should explore the possibility of expanding the 
current NATO-Russia Council into a mechanism used for eventual admission of Russia 
into NATO as an “associate member.” Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia are all of critical 
importance to the Euro-Atlantic security and integrating their defense/military 
establishments into NATO (for combined security operations) could bring greater 
security to the Alliance.  Such a policy could enhance European security by continuing to 
use NATO as a mechanism for resolving disputes between nations within the alliance, 
and secondarily, as a mutual defense organization aimed at preventing conflicts with 
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external actors.  One of the major reasons that Russia’s membership has never been 
seriously considered in the past is that NATO does not want to be obligated to defend 
Russia in third party conflicts with outside powers, such as China. 
The current policy of dividing Europe into NATO and non-NATO countries 
creates insecurity on the continent and is reminiscent of the failed security structures of 
the last century.  Having the world’s two major nuclear powers in the same alliance 
would also enhance efforts at nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear and conventional force 
reductions, and ballistic missile defense that have been slowed by Cold War security 
structures that inhibit progress.  Such a policy would also allow for greater cooperation in 
other areas of common interest such as combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and other 
economic and environmental problems.   
The United States should continue its close bilateral engagement with Georgia 
and through NATO and seek avenues of cooperation and conflict resolution with regard 
to its unresolved separatist wars.  However, a U.S. policy of unlimited support for 
Georgia’s NATO membership could encourage an assertive Georgian nationalist policy 
in the separatist areas (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) vis-à-vis Russia that reduce incentives 
for peaceful conflict resolution.  In regard to Article 5, NATO membership could be 
viewed by Georgia as a way of protecting the country from Russia, rather than as a means 
to boost internal reform and development (Razoux, 2009, p. 7).  Unlimited U.S. support 
for Georgia’s NATO membership also could undermine incentives for Georgia to seek 
out regional sources of security in the South Caucasus and greater Caucasus region.  
Regional defensive initiatives that build on local and regional sources of national 
security, such as a Caucasus Regional Security and Cooperation initiative between 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, have not been fully explored.   
Georgia does have the right to join the collective defense alliance of its choice; 
however, the NATO alliance has an equal obligation to ensure that its members can 
credibly fulfill the commitments it has made.  In this light, the military capabilities of 
new member states should be a central consideration for continued enlargement, rather 
than political considerations in accordance with NATO Defense Paper number 33.  The  
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Defense Paper recommends, “The contribution that a new member can make to the 
Alliance’s collective capabilities should be the deciding factor for membership (Kamp, 
2007, p. 4).   
Finally, even if no formal pledge or commitment was ever made to Gorbachev in 
1990 regarding Alliance eastward expansion (Kramer, 2009), NATO enlargement to 
include Georgia as a full member with a security guarantee would likely be perceived by 
Russia as evidence of yet another Western betrayal of post Cold War arrangements and 
an affront to its professed status as a resurgent great power (p. 54).  A U.S. bilateral 
security guarantee to Georgia would fuel even greater geopolitical tensions with Russia 
and could increase uncertainty in the region.  As a result, Georgia’s search for an absolute 
security guarantee, could risk unleashing unintended “Great Game” consequences that 
might also threaten its sovereignty and independence.   
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